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Let the River Run: Strategies to Remove Obsolete Dams
and Defeat Resulting Fifth Amendment Taking Claims
Christopher Scoones†
This dam removal is far more than a symbol of the shifting tide in
American conservation.
—Bruce Babbitt1
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I. INTRODUCTION
America’s obsession with controlling nature for the benefit of
industrialization has made us a dam nation. “The untransacted destiny of
the American people . . . to subdue the continent” was accomplished
largely by building dams.2 Dams encouraged settlement by generating
electric power, improving navigation, providing flood control, and
delivering water for agricultural, municipal, and industrial development.
As a result, “[w]e have been building, on average, one large dam . . .
every single day, since the Declaration of Independence.”3 Seventy-six

2. William Gilpin, Mission of the North American People: Geographical, Social, and Political
130 (J.B. Lippincott and Co. 1874) (quoting a report to the U.S. Senate of 1846), reprinted in Chris
J. Magoc, So Glorious a Landscape: Nature and the Environment in American History and Culture
(Scholarly Resources 2002).
3. Bruce Babbitt, Sec’y of the Interior, Address at the Ecological Soc’y of Am. (Aug. 4, 1998),
available at http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/DamsAreNotForever.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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thousand large dams,4 including 8,100 major dams,5 entomb 600,000
river miles of water.6 Counting dams of all sizes, there are well over 2.5
million in American waters.7 As one author has observed, “[v]irtually no
major river in the United States is without a dam.”8
Yet this progress has come at a price. A dammed river will never
function the same as a free-flowing river. The essence of a river is water
movement. Damming America’s waters has caused a dramatic decline in
the health of our watersheds. Dams are physical barriers that block the
natural flow of nutrients and the migration of fish.9 “Leaves are no longer
carried to awaiting insects, and the insects are no longer carried by the
waters to foraging fish.”10 Normally, pebbles, sand, and fallen trees move
downstream to eventually settle and form diverse habitat.11 “Fallen trees
provide areas of shade and slack water[, while s]ubmerged gravel beds
make a home for [invertebrates and] act as spawning grounds for
migratory fish . . . .”12 But when a dam is built, the flow of sediment is
trapped behind the impoundment, causing the downstream river bottom
to wash away and leave a coarse riverbed in which some invertebrates,
an essential food source for fish, cannot survive.13 The lack of sediment
recharge further disrupts and destroys deltas and estuaries, the nurseries
of a river.14
In addition to acting as physical barriers, dams change water levels
and the timing of flows.15 River flow volumes are meant to vary widely
from season to season, and this variability “is an indispensible part of
how a river system works.”16 For example, the lifecycles of many river

4. THE HEINZ CTR., DAM REMOVAL: SCIENCE AND DECISION MAKING 23 (2002). This 1996
figure comes from the National Inventory of Dams, which catalogs all dams greater than six feet
high with more than fifty acre-feet of storage, and those that are twenty-five feet high with more than
fifteen acre-feet of storage.
5. The National Inventory of Dams defines a major river as being fifty feet tall with a storage
capacity of at least 5,000 acre feet, or of any height with a storage capacity of 25,000 acre feet. Nat’l
Inventory of Dams, Major Dams of the United States, NAT’L ATLAS OF THE U.S.,
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/mld/dams00x.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
6. Babbitt, supra note 3.
7. HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 23.
8. Elizabeth Grossman, Watershed: the Undamming of America 3 (Counterpoint 2002).
9. Peter J. Carney, Dam Removal: Evolving Federal Policy Opens a New Venue of Fisheries
and Ecosystem Management, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 309, 327 (2000).
10. Id. at 328.
11. Hydropower Reform Coal., Dam Effects, DAMEFFECTS.ORG, http://www.dameffects.org
(last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Hydropower Reform Coal., supra note 11.
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species follow the timing of high and low flows, with seasonal events
like high springtime flows triggering a new phase in their lives.17
Last, but certainly not least, dams make for poor water quality. Two
common water quality problems associated with dams are temperature
and dissolved oxygen.18 The water from deep behind an impoundment
can be significantly cooler than the downstream river’s shallow and sunsoaked waters.19 “In the summer, temperatures can be unnaturally cold
on the bottom of [the impoundment] and too warm on the surface.”20
While “[i]n winter, deep waters can be unnaturally warm.”21
Dissolved oxygen, essential for aquatic life, is also altered. “[W]hen
organic materials that have built up behind the dam begin to decompose,
they consume the limited [amounts of dissolved] oxygen [available].”22
The lowest levels of the reservoir become devoid of oxygen, creating
dead zones that cannot support river life. Depending upon how a dam is
constructed, water may be released from either the top or bottom of the
impoundment. Water released from the top of the impoundment may
cause excessive uptake of air from the atmosphere and result in water
that contains too much atmospheric gas.23 Conversely, water released
from the bottom of a deep reservoir is oxygen-deprived.24 These effects
on water temperature, oxygen level, rate of flow, composition of
spawning beds, and food supply have so negatively impacted the ability
of anadromous fish to survive that the salmon has become a cause
célèbre in the Pacific Northwest.25
But reasons for dam removal go beyond environmental concerns.
By 2020, over 60,000 dams (eighty percent) listed in the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ (Army Corps of Engineers) National Inventory of
Dams will be more than fifty years old and nearing the end of their
design life.26 Structural obsolescence poses significant safety risks to
human life,27 and the cost of performing necessary structural repairs
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Carney, supra note 9, at 327.
20. Hydropower Reform Coal., supra note 11.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Mo. Dep't of Natural Res., Water Chemistry, Introductory Level Workshop 4,
http://www.dnr.mo.gov/env/wpp/vmqmp/vwqm-intro07.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
24. Id.
25. See generally THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 47 (“[The Pacific Northwest] is famous for
severely depleted salmon runs and large hydroelectric projects that may be contributing to the
declines.”).
26. Id. at 41.
27. See generally id. at 42 (“Dam safety and security is a major issue in the consideration of
dam removal.”). According to the National Inventory of Dams, roughly thirty-two percent of dams
(26,652 dams) pose a high or significant hazard potential. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, Dams by
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often exceeds the price of removal.28 Many dams have also become
economically obsolete, outliving the mills or regional power grids they
once served.29 Early hydropower facilities that generated electrical power
for regional power grids are now serviced by larger, more efficient
sources on the national grid.30 Hydropower facilities once provided an
all-time high of one-third of the nation’s electrical energy during the
1940s,31 but by 1996 hydropower accounted for only one-tenth of the
nation’s total generating capacity.32 Recognizing that the public interest
now favors a healthy, free-flowing river over electric power generation,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has taken the
unprecedented step of ordering the removal of obsolete dams.33
This article explores ways to remove dams whose existence no
longer benefits the public because of environmental, safety, or economic
concerns. Three legal tools could accomplish this: (1) the Endangered
Species Act, (2) federal and state dam safety proceedings, and (3) the
FERC’s hydropower relicensing procedure. Each of these avenues will
be explored, followed by a discussion of Fifth Amendment taking claims
and other sources of liability that could result from dam removal.
II. LEGAL TOOLS TO REMOVE DAMS
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act34 (ESA) can be an effective tool for
the removal of public and private hydropower and nonhydropower dams.
The ESA is a federal statute implemented to protect endangered and
threatened fish, wildlife, and plant species, and the ecosystems upon
which they depend. While the ESA has never been used to force dam
removal, it has spurred both the federal government and private entities
to voluntarily remove dams in order to avoid ESA takings claims.35
Hazard Potential, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:2016393
958697412::NO (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
28. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 44 (“[Removal of a dam] may be much less expensive
than . . . performing needed structural repairs.”).
29. Id. at 43. In the eastern United States, “dams that diverted . . . streams for millraces or
raised water levels to drive waterwheels lasted longer than the mills they served.” Id.
30. Id. at 43–44.
31. The History of Hydropower Development in the United States, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
32. Carney, supra note 9, at 311.
33. FERC Project Decommissioning at Relicensing; Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 339, 342–
43 (Jan. 4, 1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.24) [hereinafter FERC Policy Statement].
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–43 (2009).
35. Margaret B. Bowman, Legal Perspectives on Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 739, 741
(2002).
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The ongoing Elwha Ecosystem Restoration Project—the nation’s
largest dam removal project—is a prime example.36 In September 2011
the process of removing the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams to restore
the free flow of the Elwha River began.37 It is “the largest dam removal
project in U.S. history[, and] will reopen more than 70 miles of pristine
[salmon] spawning and rearing habitat in the Elwha River and its
tributaries.”38 The National Park Service predicts that salmon populations
will “swell from 3,000 to nearly 400,000 as all five species of Pacific
salmon return” to the iconic Pacific Northwest river.39 Although
congressional legislation was the ultimate force behind the dam’s
removal,40 fear of future ESA liability was no doubt taken into account.41
The ESA has also been responsible for changing the way dams
operate by requiring the installation of fish passage devices and
maintenance of certain flow levels for the protection of threatened
species.42 Use of the ESA’s citizen suit provision to enforce a taking of a
protected species could result in an injunction to modify a dam’s
operation or force its removal.43 For these reasons, the ESA provides the
impetus for the voluntary removal of many private dams.44 Where
removal cannot be accomplished voluntarily, two sections of the ESA
could be used to compel dam removal: (1) the “consultation” or
prevention of jeopardy provisions in Section 7, and (2) the prohibition of
taking a listed species in Section 9.45 Each of these sections will be
discussed below.
36. Elwha River Restoration, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/elw
ha-ecosystem-restoration.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3173
(1992).
41. See Elwha River Restoration: Background and History, AMERICAN RIVERS,
http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/elwha-riverbackground.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (“The dam’s owner became increasingly concerned that a
court order would some day force it to remove the dams and foot the bill for river restoration.”).
After removal of the dams began, several organizations sued the National Park Service and other
agencies for violations of the Endangered Species Act associated with the Elwha Fish River
Restoration Plan. Notice Letter from the Wild Fish Conservancy et al. to the Nat’l Park Serv. et al.
(Sept.
16,
2011),
available
at
http://wildfishconservancy.org/copy_of_news/in-thenews/notice.letter2011.09.16.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation—
Biological Opinion, Cushman Hydroelectric Project, Project No. 460-033, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv. Ref. No. 13410-2010-F-0169, at 53 (Apr. 2010) (on file with author) (recommending the use
of fish-passage protocols for the conservation of bull trout on the Skokomish River).
43. Cf. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting an injunction
against a logging company under citizen suit provision of the ESA).
44. Bowman, supra note 35, at 741.
45. Id.
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1. Section 7
Section 7 of the ESA prohibits federal action that destroys or
otherwise adversely modifies the critical habitat of a listed species or that
jeopardizes the continued existence of a listed species.46 These are two
distinct standards.47 The “destruction/adverse modification standard” has
been defined “in terms of actions that diminish the value of critical
habitat for recovery.”48 The so-called “jeopardy standard” “addresses the
effect of the action itself on the survival and recovery of the species.”49
Because Section 7 is limited to actions taken by the federal
government, most private dams appear to be beyond the reach of its
protection. This is particularly troubling because according to the
National Inventory of Dams the federal government owns only about
four percent of the more than 80,000 dams inventoried.50 Fortunately,
Section 7 applies to private persons whenever a dam is built. The
construction of a dam requires the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States, an activity governed by Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act (CWA).51 If the dam is built in navigable waters, the
discharge must be authorized by the federal government, through the
Army Corps of Engineers, to comply with the CWA.52 States may
assume the 404 permitting program only for discharges into
nonnavigable waters.53 Even where a state has jurisdiction, the EPA
retains authority to review and reject “larger discharges with serious
impacts.”54 The federal government cannot issue a Section 404 “dredge
and fill” permit where its issuance would diminish the value of critical
habitat for recovery of a protected species or otherwise jeopardize the
species’ recovery. This is the manner in which Section 7 of the ESA is
applied indirectly to private persons.
Besides being limited to actions by the federal government, Section
7 is further applied only to proposed actions. Although it can be a
challenge to characterize a dam’s continued operation as a “proposed
action,” the federal government has sought Section 7 consultation for a

46. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2009).
47. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, supra note 27.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2010). Section 404 of the CWA established a permit program to regulate
the discharge of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States.” Id.
52. Id.
53. State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact23.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
54. Id.
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hydropower system’s annual operations plan.55 Indeed, there are many
instances where Section 7’s consultation requirement led to the
modification of existing dam operations for the benefit of fish and
wildlife.56
One further limitation in Section 7’s applicability is that the
proposed federal action must threaten the “continued existence” of the
listed species as a whole, meaning more than harm to a few of its
individuals.57 If, after the conclusion of formal consultation, the agency
determines that the proposed federal action is likely to jeopardize the
listed species, or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat, a
jeopardy finding will be issued in the biological opinion.58
This “jeopardy” biological opinion must contain “reasonable and
prudent alternatives” (RPAs) to the proposed federal action that are not
likely to jeopardize the listed species or destroy or adversely modify its
critical habitat.59 The RPAs, in turn, must be consistent with the original
purpose of the proposed federal action.60 For purposes of dam removal,
this means that neither the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
nor the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) can recommend dam
removal as an RPA unless the dam is not central to the purpose of the
proposed action.
In instances like dam removal, where no RPA can be developed, the
action cannot move forward unless the Endangered Species
Committee—the so-called “God Squad”61—grants an exemption to the
“no jeopardy” rule.62 The committee considers five factors in deciding
whether to grant an exemption: (1) the availability of reasonable and
prudent alternatives, (2) the nature and extent of the benefits of the
55. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.
1995).
56. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project No. 2082-027 (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2007/11-16-07.asp.
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2010).
58. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2009).
59. Id.
60. Reasonable and Prudent Alternative, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SW. REG’L OFFICE,
http://www.swr.noaa.gov/reasonab.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
61. The “God Squad” is a small group of officials who can override the ESA if the cost of
protecting a species is too great. The group was specifically created by an amendment to the ESA for
the purpose of allowing the Tellico Dam to be completed. KENNETH M. MUNCHISON, THE SNAIL
DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 152, 184 (2007). The God Squad
instead unanimously refused to exempt construction of the Tellico Dam on account of the snail
darter species. Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Tiny Fish / Big Battle: 30 Years after TVA and the Snail Darter
Clashed, the Case Still Echoes in Caselaw, Politics and Popular Culture, TENN. B. J. (Apr. 2008),
http://www.tba.org/Journal_Current/200804/TBJ-200804-coverStory.html.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(h) (2010).
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agency action consistent with conserving the species or its critical
habitat, (3) whether the action is in the public interest and of regional or
national significance, (4) whether there are any reasonable mitigation
measures that should be considered by the committee, and (5) whether
the agency and exemption applicant refrained from making irreversible
or irretrievable commitments of resources.63
Only rarely have the requirements of the ESA significantly delayed
or cancelled federal projects.64 Section 7 has also never singlehandedly
removed a dam. However, Section 7 has been tremendously successful in
forcing the modification of dam operations for the benefit of protected
fish and wildlife, sometimes by requiring certain instream flow levels.
a) ESA-Mandated Reductions in Water Usage Rights
One of the greatest controversies in the history of the ESA involved
applying Section 7 to the Bureau of Reclamation’s Klamath Project to
protect endangered fish. In 2001, an extreme drought hit the Klamath
River Basin, located in southern Oregon and Northern California.65
Hundreds of farmers who had reliably received water for decades from
the Klamath Project were told they would receive none.66 The federal
government would instead withhold the water and use it to protect an
endangered species of fish.67 Irrigators and their political allies were
outraged, and the controversy gained national media coverage.68 The
following year, the Bureau of Reclamation breached its Section 7 duties
and restored full irrigation deliveries.69 Thousands of salmon died from
the resulting low flows and high temperatures of the Klamath River, and
the Klamath crisis once again led the national news.70 Among federal
courts, the Ninth Circuit has played a critical role in defining the nature
63. Id. § 1536(g)(5).
64. See Steven L. Yaffee, Avoiding Species/Development Conflicts Through Interagency
Consultation, Balancing on the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for
the Future 86–89 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991). Yaffee acknowledges that a low rate of project
cancellations could also indicate the success of the ESA if agencies are incorporating endangered
species protection into project planning. Id. at 90–91.
65. Scott Learn, Klamath Basin’s Water Worries Extend to Wells, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 30,
2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2010/08/tapping_wells_in_klamath_basin.
html.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426
F.3d 1082, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting Reclamation’s ten-year operating plan for the Klamath
Project that allowed for delivery of less than the full amount of water necessary to ensure the
survival of salmon).
70. Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 2007,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/leaving_no_tracks/.
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and extent of the Bureau of Reclamation’s duties under Section 7 of the
ESA. In a case involving contractual commitments to water users, the
court rejected the argument that the Bureau breached its contracts by
reducing water deliveries in dry years.71 Stated flatly, the Bureau’s
responsibilities under the ESA “override the water rights of the
Irrigators.”72 Within the Ninth Circuit, then, Section 7 of the ESA takes
priority over federal contracts to deliver water to water users, and the
Bureau of Reclamation must operate its projects in a manner that avoids
jeopardy.73 Yet this was no certain victory for the salmon: a fatal flaw
lies beneath the surface of this seemingly simple and protective rule.
b) The Discretionary Rule
When pre-ESA legal obligations require a federal agency to operate
in a way that essentially leaves no room for the consideration of a listed
species, the so-called “discretionary rule”74 exempts the agency from
complying with the requirements of Section 7: “Section 7 . . . appl[ies] to
all actions in which there is discretionary federal involvement or
control.”75 No definition of “discretionary” involvement or control is
provided in the rule. The word “discretionary” is also absent from the
text of Section 7 of the ESA. With so little guidance as to whether a
particular federal agency action is discretionary, courts struggle to make
the determination.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the discretionary
rule has yielded three general points.76 First, discretion is determined “by
parsing the language of the statutes, rules, and permits most directly
involved.”77 Second, no discretion has been found “in cases where a
person has an existing permit or approval, and a federal agency either has
little or no authority to require changes . . . or has latent discretionary
authority but no legal duty to exercise it.”78 Third, all discretionary action
cases have involved some private activity.79 The Ninth Circuit has never
addressed a case where a federal agency claimed an absence of discretion
in implementing its own programs or projects.80
71. E.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999).
73. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 426 F.3d at 1094 (rejecting a ten-year
operating plan for the Klamath Project that provided insufficient flows to protect listed salmon).
74. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project
Operations and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (2008).
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the discretionary rule for the
first time in the landmark case of National Ass’n of Homebuilders v.
Defenders of Wildlife.81 The Court upheld as rational the EPA’s position
that it had no discretionary authority to consider the impacts on
endangered species when delegating CWA Section 402 permitting
authority to Arizona.82 The “discretionary rule,” at 50 C.F.R. § 402.23,
applies Section 7(a)(2) “to all actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control.”83 The language of Section 402 of the
CWA reads that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer application that
satisfies the nine functions specified in the section: “if the nine specified
criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a
transfer application.”84 Because an agency “cannot simultaneously obey
the differing mandates of ESA § 7(a)(2) and CWA § 402(b),” the Court
concluded that the EPA deserved deference for its rule that Section 7
applies to agency actions where “discretionary federal involvement or
control” exists.85 Consequently, the Court’s holding severely restricts the
protection of Section 7 by limiting its application to those actions where
a federal agency exercises discretion.
As for dams, whether a federal agency like the Bureau of
Reclamation has any discretion to consider endangered species in the
operation of a water project depends upon the legal regime of the specific
project. In general, three strong arguments can be made in favor of
considering the Bureau’s operation of a water project as a discretionary
activity. First, the Bureau of Reclamation “must constantly assess its
duties, the available facts, and predictions about the future . . . and make
changes as circumstances dictate.”86 Therefore, “if a discretionary action
is one that involves an exercise of judgment[,]” then the operation of a
federal water project necessarily demands discretion.87 Furthermore,
“[n]o generally applicable statute strips [the Bureau] of discretion in
operating its projects.”88 Finally, the issuance of a water supply contract
does not divest the Bureau of operating with discretion.89 Whether the
Bureau of Reclamation has any discretion in operating a project will
always be determined by the legal obligations of the particular project,

81. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007).
82. Id. at 665–67.
83. 50 C.F.R. § 402.23 (2009).
84. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders, 551 U.S. at 661.
85. Id.
86. Benson, supra note 76, at 23, 41–42.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 43.
89. Id. at 45–46.
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but strong arguments can be made against applying the discretionary rule
in this context.
2. Section 9
The second section of the ESA that could accomplish dam removal
is Section 9. The section’s taking prohibition makes it unlawful for any
person—including private and public entities—to take individuals of a
listed species.90 “Take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.”91 “Harm” is defined to include significant habitat modification
or degradation.92 Section 9 also makes it unlawful to cause another party
to take a listed species.93 Courts have applied this to government
authorization of activities that cause a take.94
Certain take activities may nonetheless be exempted from Section
9’s taking prohibition through the incidental take process. An agency
may issue a permit to take a listed species “if such taking is incidental to,
and not the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.”95
Antecedent to the issuance of an incidental take permit is the submission
of a habitat conservation plan (HCP) by the applicant.96 Taking the HCP
and public comments into account, the agency must find that the
applicant will monitor, minimize, and mitigate the impacts of any
incidental taking to the maximum extent practicable, and that the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild.97 Once an incidental take is granted, the “no
surprises” rule prohibits the federal government from requiring
additional funds or resources from the permit holder.98
Unfortunately, the practical effect of the incidental take process has
been the loss of many anadromous fish populations. The incidental take
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2010).
91. Id. § 1532(19).
92. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 725 (1995)
(holding the Secretary of the Interior’s definition of “harm” as including “significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.”).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2010).
94. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding the State violated the
ESA’s take prohibition by authorizing fishing that caused a take of the endangered northern right
whale).
95. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(1)(B) (2010).
96. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
97. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
98. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1998)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32) “[N]o additional land use restrictions or financial
compensation will be required of the permit holder with respect to species covered by the permit,
even if unforeseen circumstances arise after the permit is issued indicating that additional mitigation
is needed for a given species covered by a permit.” Id.
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permit immunizes dam owners from Section 9 liability so long as the
take does not jeopardize the entire species. The “no surprises” rule
severely limits the ability of federal agencies to further protect a listed
species if the HCP proves insufficient. Through the issuance of
incidental take permits, the government sanctions the deaths of thousands
of salmon so long as their deaths are merely incidental to a dam’s
operational goals. Even where no incidental take permit is issued and an
impermissible taking occurs, the USFWS and the NMFS can only issue
fines for violating Section 9.99
Citizens, on the other hand, have more power. A citizen suit can
result in an injunction to enforce a takings finding where no incidental
take permit has been issued.100 Effective enforcement of the ESA
therefore requires both the government and the citizenry.
In some respects, the ESA falls short of protecting threatened and
endangered anadromous fish. On the whole, however, the statute has
saved thousands of fish, and is responsible for many of the milestone
dam removals in America. The Elwha Ecosystem Restoration Project, for
example, was motivated by threat of ESA takings claims.101 Also in
Washington State, conditions attached by FERC to the Condit Dam’s
hydropower license—a process discussed in detail below—in accordance
with the ESA forced the dam’s owners to either modernize and install
expensive fish passage devices or remove the dam.102 In addition, the
ESA has changed the way many dams operate by altering instream flow
levels for the benefit of threatened species.
B. Dam Safety Proceedings
The Association of Dam Safety Officials estimates that 4,400 dams
are susceptible to failure due to structural deficiencies.103 The impact of
even a single dam failure can be tremendous. In 1889, a neglected dam in
western Pennsylvania experienced a catastrophic failure, killing over
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2009).
100. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (The environmental
group was able to obtain an injunction under the ESA against a logging company in order to
conserve marbled murrelet nesting habitat on private land).
101. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
ELWHA
RIVER
ECOSYSTEM
RESTORATION
1
(June
1995),
available
at
http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=136255.
(“The Elwha River ecosystem and native anadromous fisheries are severely degraded as a result of
two hydroelectric dams . . . . The Department of the Interior therefore finds there is a need to return
this river and ecosystem to its natural, self-regulating state, and proposes removing both dams to
accomplish this purpose . . . .”).
102. See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
103. Henry Fountain, Danger is Pent up Behind Aging Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/science/22dam.html?pagewanted=all.
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2,200 people.104 Twenty million tons of water traveled fourteen miles to
Johnstown, where four square miles of the town were completely
destroyed by a wall of water forty feet high.105 The amount of water that
would flow over Niagara Falls in thirty-six minutes, 4.8 billion
gallons,106 left a pile of debris that covered thirty acres.107 A modern
twenty-first century version of the Johnstown Flood could be even more
disastrous. If, for example, the Lake Isabella Dam in California were to
fail, 180 billion gallons of water—over thirty-seven times the amount
released in the Johnstown Flood—would inundate downstream
Bakersfield.108
Dams can fail for any one of several reasons as they age and reach
the end of their life spans. For example, the concrete used to construct
dams deteriorates over time—typically within fifty to one hundred
years109—due to the large volumes of water blocked or diverted on a
daily basis.110 If not properly maintained, these ageing dams pose a
safety hazard to people and property downstream. In its 2009
Infrastructure Report Card, the American Society of Civil Engineers
awarded dams a grade of “D,” noting the lack of funding “to reverse the
trend of increasingly deteriorating dam infrastructure.”111
Nationwide, there are 13,990 dams whose failure threatens human
life.112 Twelve dams are currently listed in the Army Corp of Engineer’s
most dangerous category: “a dam with serious problems and serious
failure consequences.”113 With over 85,000 dams in the United States
that average over fifty-one years old, the number of dams in this unsafe
category will only increase as they near the end of their lifespans.114 The
number of high-hazard dams continues to increase as dams age,
downstream development increases, and more accurate information on
watersheds and earthquake hazards becomes available.115 Repairing all
104. Facts About the Johnstown Flood, JOHNSTOWN FLOOD MUSEUM,
http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/facts.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Fountain, supra note 103.
109. Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring
America’s Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 101 (1995) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 219
(1992)).
110. American Rivers et al., Dam Removal Success Stories, at xiv (1999).
111. Policy Statement 470—Dam Repair and Rehabilitation, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS
(June 22, 2011), http://www.asce.org/Content.aspx?id=8338.
112. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, supra note 27.
113. Fountain, supra note 103.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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these dams will be expensive. A 2009 report by the Association of State
Dam Safety Officials estimates at least $50 billion would have to be
spent to repair high-hazard dams alone.116 In order to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare, these dams must either be repaired or
removed. Dam safety proceedings present a powerful tool for the
removal of these dangerous, dated dams.
1. Federal Dam Safety Programs
Many agencies administer dam safety programs at the federal level.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) does not own or
regulate dams but coordinates federal safety programs through the
National Dam Safety Program.117 The program’s purpose is to
reduce the risks to life and property from dam failure in the United
States through the establishment and maintenance of an effective
national dam safety program to bring together the expertise and resources of the federal and non-federal communities in achieving national dam safety hazard reduction.118

While it does not specifically govern or regulate dam removal, the
National Dam Safety Program encourages cooperation between federal
and state dam safety efforts and authorizes FEMA to provide grants to
states for the establishment and maintenance of dam safety programs. 119
Other federal agencies are actual owners or operators of dams: the U.S.
Department of Agriculture,120 the Department of Defense,121 the

116. Id.
117. The National Dam Safety Program was created by the Water Resources Development Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 215, 110 Stat. 3658, 3685 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 467 (2009)).
118. Id.
119. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64.
120. This includes the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Agriculture Research
Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the USDA Rural Housing and Community Programs, and the
USDA Rural Utilities Programs. The U.S. Forest Service owns approximately seven hundred midsize dams and administers permits for around two thousand privately owned dams. “The U.S.
Department of Agriculture is a major planner, designer, financier, constructor, owner, or regulator of
more than one-third of all the dams in the United States.” FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
EXCERPT FROM THE NATIONAL DAM SAFETY PROGRAM BIENNIAL REPORT 2 (2004-2005),
available at http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/FederalCommunity/Pages_from_fema576
_Feds_Biennial.pdf.
121. This includes the Army Corps of Engineers and the Departments of the Air Force, Army
and Navy who have dam safety responsibility for dams located on their respective bases. The Army
Corps oversees 631 dams, including 75 Corps hydropower plants and 67 nonfederal power plants.
The Department of the Army has jurisdiction over 212 dams while the Air Force has 24 and the
Navy has 33. Id.
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Department of Interior,122 Department of Energy,123 the Department of
Labor,124 FERC,125 and the Tennessee Valley Authority, among others.126
The Federal Power Act tasks FERC with administering dam safety
for hydropower projects on (1) navigable streams, (2) public lands of the
United States, (3) at any Government dam, and (4) on streams over
which Congress has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.127 Dam
safety is an integral component of FERC’s hydropower licensing
program.128 Staff at FERC inspect dams on an unscheduled basis, and
“every five years an independent consulting engineer approved by FERC
must inspect and evaluate dams higher than 32.8 feet, or with a total
storage capacity of more than 2,000 acre-feet [of water].”129 Where
FERC identifies safety problems at a dam, it will order the dam owner to
rectify the problem. These FERC safety inspections have led dam owners
to voluntarily remove dams where repair costs more than removal. For
example, a FERC safety inspection of Mussers Dam on Middle Creek in
Pennsylvania caused the owner to remove the dam rather than make the
required repairs.130 A 2001 report notes that at least four FERC-regulated
dams have been removed due to the cost of safety repairs.131
A report by FEMA detailed that FERC staff independently
reviewed the safety and adequacy of 336 dams by conducting over 4,000
inspections between 2006 and 2007.132 During that period, FERC
completed forty-four dam safety modifications and seventy-four dam
safety modifications remained ongoing or under review.133 Despite these
safety measures, there were two major and eighteen minor incidents of
122. The Department of the Interior “is responsible for the planning, design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of nearly 2,000 dams . . . .” Id. Bureaus in the Department include the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (425 dams), the Bureau of Land Management (515), the Bureau of
Reclamation (479), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (193), the National Park Service (538), the
Office of Surface Mining (1,370) and the U.S. Geological Survey (one high-hazard dam) Id.
123. The Department of Energy owns and had safety jurisdiction over 15 dams. Id.
124. The Department of Labor is responsible for the safety of 1,395 dams through the Mine
Safety and Health Administration. Id.
125. As of September 30, 2005, a total of 2,530 dams were under FERC jurisdiction. Id.
126. The Tennessee Valley Authority oversees 49 dams. Id.
127. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Dam Safety in the United States: A Progress Report On
The
National
Dam
Safety
Program
23
(2006–2007),
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3677.
128. Dam Safety and Inspection, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
129. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64.
130. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Order Accepting Surrender of License, American
Hydro Power Company, 64 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,097 (1993).
131. Lee Emery, A Review of Non-Federal Hydropower Dams Removed Under FERC's
Regulatory Authority, Waterpower XII Conference (2001).
132. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 127.
133. Id.
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failure at dams under FERC jurisdiction between 2006 and 2007.134
Considering that more than two-thirds of the approximately 2,600
hydropower dams within FERC’s jurisdiction are greater than fifty years
old, these safety inspections will likely result in more voluntary dam
removals in the future.135
The final major federal dam safety program is the Indian Dam
Safety Act of 1994.136 It established a dam safety maintenance and repair
program to maintain certain dams on Indian land that would present a
threat to human life were structural failure to occur.137 In 2005, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs identified 125 high-hazard and significanthazard dams, plus over 300 low-hazard dams with the potential to
become high-hazard dams.138 There were over eighty dams still requiring
major repairs in 2005.139 This program, together with the National Dam
Safety Program and FERC’s mandatory inspections, represent the extent
of federal dam safety programs.
The outlook for dam safety should improve at the federal level
following the reauthorization of the National Dam Safety Act in 2006. 140
This legislation will assist states in improving their dam safety programs,
support increased technical training for state dam safety engineers and
technicians, and provide additional funding for dam safety research and
maintenance of the National Inventory of Dams.141 A FEMA report in
2009 showed that ninety-four percent of federal high-hazard potential
dams were inspected within the last five years.142 Increased safety
inspections will hopefully result in further voluntary removals of unsafe
and obsolete dams whose cost to perform necessary safety repairs
exceeds the price of removal.
2. State Dam Safety Programs
State safety-related dam inspections are responsible for more dam
removals than federal inspections. In fact, they are “the most common
legal proceedings resulting in dam removal,”143 with “State dam safety
134. Id. at 30.
135. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 3801 (2009).
137. Id.
138. Bureau of Indian Affairs—Dam Safety and Dam Maintenance Assessment,
EXPECTMORE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003704.2005.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
139. Id.
140. National Inventory of Dams, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://www.usace.army.mil/L
ibrary/Maps/Pages/NationalInventoryofDams.aspx.
141. Dam Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-460, 120 Stat. 3401.
142. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 127.
143. Bowman, supra note 355, at 739.
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programs regulat[ing] 80 percent of the 84,000 dams listed in the
National Inventory of Dams.”144 Most states have dam safety laws that
require the periodic inspection of every dam over a certain size.
Vermont, for example, regulates dams that are, or will be, capable of
impounding more than 500,000 cubic feet of water.145 A dam of any size
in Vermont is subject to a safety inspection if ten or more people, or a
local municipality, petition for an investigation.146 The investigative
findings are then exhibited at a hearing, whereupon the agency having
jurisdiction makes a determination as to whether the “dam as maintained
or operated is unsafe or is a menace to people or property.”147 Then the
agency “shall issue an order directing reconstruction, repair, removal,
breaching, draining or other action it considers necessary to make the
dam safe.”148 Removal of a small unsafe dam typically costs less than
repairing it. Among ten cases examined by American Rivers, the cost of
dam removal cost was only thrity-seven percent of the total estimated
repair cost.149
Consider, for example, a 150-year-old millpond dam in Wisconsin.
The dam was deemed unsafe by the state Department of Natural
Resources because of concern that rainstorms, combined with the
pressure of the millpond, might damage the dam and destroy downstream
businesses and residences.150 The dam owner was ordered to either
rebuild the dam to meet safety standards or remove it.151 With the cost of
rebuilding the dam estimated at $1 million, the owner felt that rebuilding
and maintaining the dam would be “too expensive and bothersome.”152
Expenses typically associated with aging dams include increasing
maintenance costs, liability insurance, and the repeated dredging of silt
that accumulates behind the impoundment.153 The owner also chose

144. ASS'N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, 2010-11 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2011), available
at http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PDF/Annual%20Reports/AnnualRept_FY11.pdf.
145. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1082 (2009).
146. Id. § 1095.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. AM. RIVERS, PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL (2000), available at act.americanrivers.org/site
/DocServer/pdr-color.pdf?docID=727 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
150. Kelly Smith, Zerwekh Dam Settlement Possible, Suit, LAKE COUNTRY REP., Oct. 17,
2011, http://www.livinglakecountry.com/lakecountryreporter/news/zerwekh-dam-settlementpossible-131981513.html.
151. Kelly Smith, Hearing Rescheduled on Zerwekh Dam Suit, LAKE COUNTRY REP., July 27,
2011, http://www.livinglakecountry.com/lakecountryreporter/news/126264218.html.
152. Smith, supra note 150.
153. Dam Removal, MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7153-10364_52259_27415-80303--,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
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removal for ecological reasons, citing a desire to restore the river to its
natural riverbed.154
Dam removal is best accomplished as a voluntary undertaking. As
described above, state and federal dam safety programs can serve as the
impetus for a dam owner’s decision to remove a dam. Removal of these
dangerous dams protects people and property plus confers great
ecological benefits to the watershed. Voluntary removal also avoids any
Fifth Amendment taking claims from the dam owner—an important
concern that will be explored in depth below.
C. FERC and Hydropower Dam Relicensing
Voluntary dam removal can also stem from FERC’s hydropower
licensing process, which must comply with the ESA. To protect
threatened and endangered fish, FERC attached conditions to the renewal
of PacifiCorp’s hydropower license for the Condit Dam in Washington
State. The dam, construction of which began in 1911, did not provide
fish passage.155 After PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a new license,
FERC issued an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with the
ESA that required PacifiCorp to update the dam to allow fish passage. 156
Modernizing the dam would have cost more than three times the price of
removal, leading PacifiCorp to choose voluntary removal.157 Fourteen
miles of salmon habitat and thirty-three miles of steelhead habitat were
reopened, and 8,000 salmon may one day return again to spawn in the
White Salmon River.158
The Condit Dam illustrates FERC’s change of mind that began with
its unprecedented action at the Edwards Dam in Maine. Recognizing for
the first time that the ecological cost of dams and the safety hazards they
pose now tip the public interest in favor of dam removal, FERC ordered
the decommissioning of a hydropower project where the owner actively
sought a hydropower license renewal.159 This historic action—discussed
in more detail below—presents a third tool to accomplish dam removal.

154. Smith, supra note 150.
155. Linda V. Mapes, Condit Dam To Be Demolished Wednesday, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
25, 2011, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016606447_condit26m.htm
l.
156. Associated Press, Condit Dam Breached to Help Local Fish, SEATTLEPI.COM, Oct. 26,
2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Condit-Dam-breached-2238048.php.
157. Id. (The Condit Dam was removed on October 26, 2011)
158. “Before construction, historical accounts from Yakama tribal members indicated some
8,000 adult salmon and steelhead returned to the river.” Mapes, supra note 155.
159. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255
(1997) (order denying new license and requiring dam removal).
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1. The Statutory Scheme for Hydropower Licensing
The potential removal of any private, municipal, or state
hydropower dam will involve FERC.160 Federal hydropower dams, on
the other hand, are authorized by Congress and constructed by the
Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and are subject to National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and ESA requirements.161
Hydropower projects are regulated by FERC pursuant to the Federal
Power Act (FPA).162 The FPA requires a license for the construction and
maintenance of a hydropower project if it is on, or affects, navigable
waters, public land, or reservations, or if it uses surplus water from any
government dam.163 In addition, a license may be required for a project
on a nonnavigable river if the project will affect interstate or foreign
commerce.164
During hydropower’s heyday—in 1940 over 1,500 hydropower
plants produced about one-third of the United States’ electricity165—
FERC issued thousands of hydropower licenses. These operating licenses
are valid for between thirty and fifty years.166 When a license expires, the
dam owner must reapply to FERC to obtain a new license.167 As part of
this relicensing process, FERC must determine whether issuing a new
license is in the public interest by giving equal consideration to power
and nonpower uses of the river:
In deciding whether to issue any license under this Part for any project, the Commission, in addition to the power and development
purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including
160. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 61.
161. Id. Note that FERC also regulates private hydropower dams on federal land. For example,
FERC regulates the Glines Canyon Dam, previously operated by Daishowa Corp. that is located in
Olympic National Park. Elwha River Restoration: Background and History, AM. RIVERS,
http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/elwha-riverbackground.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
162. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (2009).
163. Id. § 797(e). Navigable waters “means those parts of streams or other bodies of water over
which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce . . . and which either in
their natural or improved condition . . . are used or suitable for use for the transportation or persons
or property in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” Id. § 796(8).
164. Id. § 817.
165. The History of Hydropower Development in the United States, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html.
166. Office of Hydropower Licensing, Origin of Hydroelectric Regulation, FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/regulation/origin.asp
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
167. 16 U.S.C. § 808 (2009).
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related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational
opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality.168

This section of the FPA, section 4(e), is referred to as the equal
consideration requirement.
In 1994, FERC issued a policy statement asserting authority under
the FPA “to deny new licenses to hydroelectric projects when existing
licenses expire.”169 This authority comes from Section 10(a) of the FPA
and represents the core of FERC’s licensing responsibilities.170 Known as
the “comprehensive development standard,” Section 10(a) reads:
That the project adopted . . . will be best adapted to a comprehensive scheme for improving and developing a waterway or waterways for the use and benefit of interstate and foreign commerce, for
the improvement and utilization of water power development, for
the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for
other beneficial public uses . . . .171

A third important provision of the FPA is Section 10(j), which
requires expressly that in every license it issues, FERC must establish
conditions for the adequate and equitable protection of, mitigation of
damages to, and enhancement of fish and wildlife.172 These three
provisions of the FPA form the current statutory scheme within which
FERC operates when issuing hydropower licenses—a scheme that tasks
FERC with reaching “an appropriate balance between power . . . and the
protection of nondevelopment resources, such as fish and wildlife.”173
This balance can normally be accommodated through license conditions,
but as the 1994 policy statement asserted, where conditioning authority is
“inadequate to do the job, i.e., where there was unacceptable
environmental damage that proved irremediable . . . [FERC] does not
read the Act as requiring it to issue a license.”174 If a license cannot be
crafted that comports with the standards set forth in Section 10(a), FERC
has the power to deny the license.175

168. Id. § 797.
169. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33.
170. Id. at 342 (“[T]he strictures of section 10(a), which the courts have long recognized rests
at the core of the Commission's licensing responsibilities.”).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a).
172. Id. § 803(j).
173. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 342.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 343.
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Outright denial of a license is, of course, highly unusual. The more
likely scenario is that the issuance of a license will be conditioned upon
environmental mitigation measures, and the licensee may be unwilling to
accept the conditions because they render the project unprofitable.176 In
such a case, the hydropower project may have to shut down. The
Commission rejects the notion that “a condition in a power license is per
se unreasonable if, as a result of imposing the condition, the project is no
longer economically viable.”177 The statute calls for a balancing of
development and nondevelopment interests. To favor power and
development interests over environmental concerns is contrary to the
Federal Power Act.178 Furthermore, the Act makes no guarantee of
profitability.179 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “there
can be no guarantee of profitability of water power projects under the
Federal Power Act; profitability is at risk from a number of variable
factors, and values other than profitability require appropriate
consideration.”180 Consequently, FERC is free to condition the issuance
of a hydropower license on protecting or restoring environmental values,
even if the cost of meeting these conditions makes the project
economically unviable and forces it to shut down. And when a
hydropower project shuts down, the 1994 policy statement stipulates that
the project owner is responsible for the costs of decommissioning, which
can include dam removal.181
The Commission does not have to wait until the end of a license
term to order decommissioning. Section 6 of the FPA governs surrender
or termination of a license.182 A licensee can explicitly or implicitly
apply for license surrender.183 The terms of some licenses even expressly
permit the Commission to order decommissioning within the license
term.184 Finally, the Commission can also initiate a revocation
proceeding.185 In all other instances, the licensee is secure against midterm surrenders.186
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994).
181. “[N]ormally . . . the Commission anticipates that the licensee will be responsible for
paying the costs (up to a reasonable level) of the steps needed to decommission the project, since the
licensee created the project and benefitted from its operations . . . .” FERC Policy Statement, supra
note 33, at 346.
182. 18 C.F.R. § 6.1 (2007).
183. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 344 n.43.
184. Id.
185. Id. Sections 26 and 31 of the FPA govern revocation proceedings.
186. Id.
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2. The Statutory Scheme in Action: FERC Orders the Historic Removal of the Edwards Dam
In 1997, FERC made history. For the first time ever, it denied an
application for hydropower license renewal and instead ordered the
Edwards Dam in Maine be decommissioned.187 The Edwards Dam was
built on the Kennebec River in 1837 to provide mechanical power for
mills.188 Electrical power generators were installed in 1913 to provide
power for Edwards Manufacturing Co.189 The mill closed in the 1980s,
but electrical power generation continued with the company contracting
to sell the electricity.190 With the hydropower project license set to expire
at the end of 1993, Edwards filed an application for a new hydropower
license in 1991.191
The Commission’s response was unheard-of: the license was denied
and removal of the dam was ordered, even though the licensee actively
sought a new license.192 Explaining its reasoning behind the order, the
Commission states:
We believe that the public interest in this proceeding lies in our
denying the license application and requiring the licensees to remove Edwards Dam. The environmental benefits of so doing substantially outweigh the environmental benefits of relicensing, even
with extensive mitigation measures. . . . A critical factor is that several important fish species native to the Kennebec River cannot be
restored to their historical habitat without dam removal, because of
their inability to use fish passage facilities.193

For the removal of private, state, and municipal hydropower dams,
the events at Edwards Dam illustrate the power of FERC’s licensing
process and the triumph of the public interest. The federal government
has finally recognized the value of a free-flowing river over electric
power generation and private profit: “[B]y the time the first licenses
began to expire, the concept of the inevitability of power operation from
a particular project was eroding.”194
The Commission’s policy statement and the decommissioning of
the Edwards Dam were unprecedented uses of its power under the FPA,
187. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255
(1997) (order denying new license and requiring dam removal).
188. Edwards Dam Removal Update, ME. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, www.maine.gov/spo/spec
ialprojects/docs/edwsdam_theriverrunsfree.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 (1997).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 342.
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and some are now questioning whether it acted within the bounds of its
authority. The hydroelectric industry, for example, has claimed that
FERC lacks authority to impose conditions that make a project
economically unviable, and that such an action is both a breach of
contract and a Fifth Amendment taking of private property when the
licensee receives no compensation.195 The Commission also asserts
authority to order dam removal at the owner’s expense.196 Under current
FERC policy, dam owners are instructed to make provisions for dam
decommissioning costs.197
The Edwards Dam removal avoided these issues because all parties
actively involved in the relicensing signed a settlement agreement
providing for a transfer of the dam’s ownership to the State of Maine for
dam removal purposes.198 Funding for the removal will come entirely
from private sources.199 Dam removal costs and a decade of fish
restoration efforts are to be financed principally by upriver dam owners
(in exchange for delaying their fish passage obligations) and by a
downstream shipbuilder (as mitigation for expanding its shipyard
operations).200 As many of the hydropower industry’s arguments remain
unaddressed by courts, the following analysis will explore whether a
valid Fifth Amendment taking claim may result where dam removal is
ordered.
III. TESTING FOR A FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING
Dam removal may result in a number of Fifth Amendment taking
claims from affected parties. A taking claim asserts that a government
action has “taken” a protected property interest without the necessary
eminent domain proceedings. The Constitution offers protection from
takings: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”201 This allows a property owner to sue the
government and seek compensation for the private property taken.
Generally, three forms of a taking are recognized: a physical taking, a
regulatory taking, and a hybrid of both known as an exaction.202
195. Beth Bryant, FERC’s Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power Act, 74
WASH. L. REV. 95, 98 (1999).
196. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 346.
197. Id. at 340.
198. Am. Rivers, Friends of the Earth & Trout Unlimited, Dam Removal Success Stories:
Restoring Rivers Through Selective Removal of Dams that Don’t Make Sense 61 (1999).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. Only the first two forms will receive in-depth examination. An exaction is a hybrid
between a physical and regulatory taking that occurs when the government attaches a condition on
the development of land. The landowner must agree to dedicate a portion of the land for a public
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A. Physical Taking
When the government physically invades private property, or causes
it to be invaded by persons or things, a physical taking has occurred.203
Under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., permanent
physical occupations of property are per se takings.204 Examples include
“flooding from a government dam that is continuous or at least inevitably
recurring, regular and low overflights by government airplanes,
government installation of relatively permanent structures on private
property[, and] shoreline erosion caused by government jetties.”205 “In
contrast with regulatory takings, [discussed next,] the magnitude of the
intrusion[,] the economic impact on the property owner, or the
importance of the government interest advanced,” are “immaterial” in the
context of a physical taking.206
Appropriations of private property to the government are given the
same per se treatment as permanent physical occupations: “The
paradigmatic taking . . . is a direct government appropriation or physical
invasion of private property.”207 Recently, when the amount of water
available to water rights holders from federal reclamation projects was
reduced in order to protect fish listed under the ESA it was treated as a
physical—rather than a regulatory—taking.208
B. Regulatory Taking
The Fifth Amendment protection from taking, once limited to
physical occupation of property, now encompasses protection from
government regulation that “goes too far.”209 Courts have developed
several tests to determine when a regulation goes too far, believing that
the Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”210 Total regulatory taking
claims are subject to the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council211 test,
purpose. ROBERT MELTZ, SUBSTANTIVE TAKINGS LAW: A PRIMER 38 (2009). Exactions typically do
not arise in the context of dam removal.
203. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic taking
requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private
property.”).
204. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
205. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 34.
206. Id.
207. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
208. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
209. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
210. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 15 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
211. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992).
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while partial regulatory taking claims are decided under the Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York test.212
1. The Lucas “Total Taking” Rule
In Lucas, a South Carolina statute prohibited the building of
permanent structures on beachfront real estate.213 Petitioner Lucas argued
that because the regulation prohibited development of his beachfront lots
the regulation amounted to a taking of property.214 The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed and held that just compensation is required if the regulation
deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of the land,
regardless of any public purpose that the regulation may serve.215
Two important caveats come with this holding. First, despite a total
elimination of use and/or value, a restriction is not a taking if it merely
duplicates what could have been achieved under “background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance,” which existed when the
owner acquired title to the property.216 These background principles limit
the rights acquired by the property owner, meaning there can be no
taking when the government restriction eliminates a right the landowner
never possessed. One cannot lose a right that one never had.
Second, the “total taking” must deprive the landowner of one
hundred percent of the property’s use and/or value for a Lucas claim. In
Lucas, the Court specifically acknowledged that a landowner suffering a
ninety-five percent loss of value would not come under the total taking
rule.217 Consequently, regulation that denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land is relatively rare.218
2. Penn Central’s “Partial Regulatory Taking” Test
For regulations that remove less than one hundred percent of the
property’s use and/or value, the Penn Central balancing framework is
used. “To determine whether a partial regulatory taking has occurred,
examine the government action for its (1) economic impact on the
property owner, (2) degree of interference with the owner’s ‘distinct’
investment-backed expectations, and (3) ‘character of government

212. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
213. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007–08.
214. Id. at 1009.
215. See id. at 1015 (“The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”).
216. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
217. Id. at 1019 n.8.
218. Id. at 1018.
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action.’ ”219 Courts will generally assess all three factors, although any
single factor, if sufficiently compelling, can be conclusive that a taking
has occurred.220 The Court has shed little light on the content of each of
the factors, or how to balance them, leaving an ad hoc test of “vexing
subsidiary questions.”221
The first Penn Central factor, economic impact, is measured by
most courts in terms of remaining economic use, but the Federal Circuit
and Court of Federal Claims focus instead on remaining market value.222
For this factor to favor a taking, the economic impact must be “very
substantial, arguably severe, when the other factors are not
determinative.”223 The degree of economic loss must be so severe as to
be the functional equivalent of a physical invasion or physical
appropriation of the land.224 Even deprivation of a parcel’s “highest and
best” use is not, without more, a taking.225 Some decisions have noted the
importance of leaving the landowner with the possibility of a “reasonable
return,” usually in the context of a pre-existing property use.226 The
Federal Circuit and CFC use the recoupment of cost as a metric for
economic impact.227 This is the formula preferred by a hydropower
project owner seeking to recover its cost basis in the project.
The second Penn Central factor, investment-backed expectations,
“is often seen as having two steps: (1) [d]id the claimant have actual
investment-backed expectations[,] and (2) [w]ere those expectations
objectively reasonable?”228 It is worth noting that those who voluntarily
enter a heavily regulated field are presumed to lack a reasonable
expectation that the legislature will not enact new requirements as
necessary.229 Hydropower is certainly a heavily regulated field, so
219. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 16 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
220. Id.
221. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
222. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 19.
223. Id.
224. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
225. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). “Highest and best
use” refers to the reasonably probable and physically possible, legal use of a property resulting in the
greatest value. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 20.
226. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(ninety-six percent reduction in rate of return favors the existence of a taking).
227. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“In determining the severity of economic impact, the owner’s opportunity to recoup its investment
or better . . . cannot be ignored.”); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 266 (2001) (“[C]ase law
thus makes it clear that profit or return on investment is a factor to be considered in assessing
economic impact. . . .”), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
228. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 22.
229. Id. at 23.
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projects owners can be presumed to lack reasonable investment-backed
expectations when operating in a constantly evolving regulatory field.
The third and final Penn Central factor looks to the character of the
government action. This includes the government’s purpose and the
regulation’s value, public benefit, or effectiveness. Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., however, suggests that this factor is less important than the
previous two Penn Central factors.230
One final quirk of the Penn Central test is the parcel as a whole
rule. Any given parcel of land includes three dimensions: spatial,
functional, and temporal.231 But the law of takings “does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated . . . this Court
focuses . . . [on the] extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole . . . .”232 Described another way, “where an owner possess a full
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle
is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”233
This rule is not always followed as it is not applied in cases where
the property rights are considered so fundamental as to tolerate little or
no infringement.234 Generally, however, a property owner must be
deprived of all economically viable use of the entire parcel of property,
not just a portion of the parcel, to support a finding that a regulatory
taking has occurred.
IV. TAKING CLAIMS FROM DAM OWNERS
A. FERC’s Decommissioning of a Hydropower Dam
When FERC issues an order to decommission, a hydropower
license is denied, the dam structure is destroyed, and future revenues
from hydropower generation are lost. Is compensation due to the project
owners? The first inquiry in any takings claim is whether the claimant
can point to a protected property interest. This necessitates determining
the nature of the licensee’s property interest. Dam owners may claim a
property interest in the entire hydropower project or in the project’s
several smaller component interests. These include the project works,
surrounding lands, and water use rights.

230. Id. at 24.
231. Id. at 28.
232. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)).
233. Id.
234. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 30. An example includes the fundamental right to bequeath
property. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
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If the licensee has a property interest, the reduction of the economic
value of that property by the regulation must be calculated, looking at the
licensee’s parcel as a whole. Where one hundred percent of the
property’s economic value is lost, the Lucas test requires
compensation.235 If less than a total loss of all economic value occurs, the
Penn Central test must be applied. Thus, whether a dam owner is entitled
to just compensation for any of these interests will depend on the nature
of the property interest and the extent of the loss in economic value of
the property.
1. Loss of the Dam and Other Associated Structures
When a hydropower project owner is ordered to remove the dam, as
was the case with the Edwards Dam,236 the owner may claim a total one
hundred percent loss in the economic value of the dam and other
associated structures removed from the water. These taking claims are
easily defeated on two grounds.
First, the parcel as a whole rule should defeat most taking claims by
project owners. Under both Penn Central and Lucas, a court must assess
the economic loss to the property owner compared with what the owner
still has.237 In performing this assessment, courts look to the parcel as a
whole. Even after FERC orders removal of a hydropower dam on a
nonnavigable river, some portions of the property—those on land—
remain unaffected, and even those that are affected retain some economic
uses other than hydropower generation. The licensee is normally free to
develop or resell the remaining surrounding land.
Second, while the parcel as a whole rule discussed above should
defeat most taking claims, the federal navigation servitude can also
render many takings claims inappropriate—so long as the dam is located
on a navigable waterway. The servitude is a right held for the public in
all navigable-for-title waters.238 In practical effect, it is an interest that
permits the federal government to destroy private, state-recognized
property rights for the benefit of public navigation without paying
compensation for a taking of property.
Authority for the navigation servitude comes from the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.239 Power to regulate commerce

235. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 187–95.
237. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
238. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 394 (1907) (holding forced
modifications to an obstructing bridge under the Rivers and Harbors Act noncompensable).
239. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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necessarily includes power to regulate navigation.240 The government
“may legislate to forbid or license dams in waters; its power over
improvements for navigation in rivers is absolute.”241 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the “right to control, improve, and regulate the
navigation of [navigable] waters is one of the greatest of the powers
delegated to the United States by the power to regulate commerce.”242
When this right conflicts with private property rights, “they are not
to be reconciled as between equals, but the private interest must give way
to a superior right, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that as
against the Government such private interest is not a right at all.”243
Private title to submerged lands is subservient to the government’s
interest in improving navigation.244 To require otherwise “would be to
create private claims in the public domain.”245 The servitude applies to
any government action that aids navigation.246 All dams in navigable
waters therefore exist subordinate to the federal navigation servitude. As
a result, Lucas’s background principles of property and nuisance247
prevent the dam owner from ever acquiring the right to obstruct a
navigable water; there can be no taking of a right never possessed.248
Dam owners will not have a taking claim for loss of the physical dam
structure so long as it is located on a navigable waterway.

240. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1824) (“The power of Congress, then,
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may
be, in any manner, connected with commerce with foreign nations, or among the several
States . . . .”).
241. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1940).
242. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1912).
243. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
244. See Lewis, 229 U.S. at 87 (“If the public right of navigation is the dominant right, and if,
as much the case, the title of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds subject absolutely to the
public right of navigation, this dominant right must include the right to use the bed of the water for
every purpose which is in aid of navigation.”).
245. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967) (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724–25 (1866)).
246. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 657, 674 (Fed. Cl., 2003) (“[T]he
presence of multiple governmental purposes, so long as navigation is one of those purposes, will not
defeat a navigational servitude defense.”). But cf. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725, 739 (1950) (finding the Central Valley Project was a reclamation project and not a navigation
project, despite a general Congressional declaration that the project’s purpose was to improve
navigation).
247. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
248. Id. at 1028–29 (preexisting federal navigation servitude bars physical taking); see also
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 88 (1912) (holding that implicit in the
navigation servitude is that title to submerged lands is subject to the government’s interest in
improving navigation, and the Court also held no private property was taken that would entitle the
plaintiff to compensation).
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2. Loss of Lands Surrounding the Hydropower Project
If the Edwards Dam removal249 serves as a bellwether—and there is
no reason why it should not—a dam removal order will typically not
deprive the licensee of the surrounding project lands. The Edwards Dam
removal order required removal of the dam, but did not order the
surrender of any land.250 Even though the water may no longer be used to
produce power, a dam removal order does not deprive the land of all
economic value. Again, the licensee remains free to sell or develop the
remaining riparian land. Consequently, a Penn Central (less than total
taking) analysis is appropriate.
Examining the economic impact upon which the Penn Central
inquiry “turns in large part, albeit not exclusively,”251 it is clear that loss
of the economic value of electricity generation will constitute a large
percentage of the land’s preregulation value. The Supreme Court has
never specified a set percentage minimum reduction in value for a taking,
nor does any amount (short of one hundred percent) automatically
establish a taking.252 If Lingle serves as a guide, the regulatory taking
must be the functional equivalent of a physical occupation or
appropriation of the land.253 A mere diminution in property value, even
as great as 92.5%, cannot by itself establish a taking.254 Even deprivation
of a hydropower parcel’s most profitable, “highest and best use,” electric
power generation, is not, without more, a taking.255 Some decisions have
noted the importance of leaving the claimant with a “reasonable return,”
or the ability to recoup costs, yet such an argument is easily defeated by
the fixed duration of a hydropower license, which project owners enter
into knowingly and with no guarantee of renewal or recoupment of
investment.256 While the economic impact may be severe to the project
owner, the reduction in value is less than one hundred percent. The first
of the three Penn Central factors therefore does not conclusively
establish a regulatory taking.
Moving to the second factor, the degree of interference with the
owner’s investment-backed expectations, the license’s limited duration
and terms also weigh against the reasonableness of any “distinct”
249. See supra text accompanying notes 187–200.
250. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 (1997).
251. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
252. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 317.
253. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
254. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (a seventyfive percent diminution in value not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915)
(reduction in value of tract of land from $800,000 to $60,000 (a 92.5% diminution) not a taking).
255. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
256. See infra text accompanying notes 259–75.
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investment-backed expectations as contemplated by the Penn Central
inquiry. Courts have agreed with FERC: there is no guarantee of
profitability under the Federal Power Act.257 Hydropower project owners
cannot reasonably expect that the land will forever remain profitable.
Finally, Penn Central’s third factor, the character of the government
action, also does not favor a taking as the government’s action will
always bestow a public benefit. The Commission cannot issue a
decommission order unless it is in the public interest.258 None of the
three Penn Central factors conclusively establishes a regulatory taking.
Hydropower project owners should not prevail on any taking claims for
economic loss of the project’s surrounding lands.
3. Investment-Backed Expectations: the Hydropower License as a
Protected Entitlement
Licensees may also claim a vested property right in the license to
install and operate the dam,259 at least to the extent that a reasonable
return could be achieved or the capital investment in the project
recovered.260 Under the second part of the Penn Central regulatory
taking test, the court looks to the degree of interference with the owner’s
investment-backed expectations. Under this part of the test, the court
asks two questions: (1) Did the claimant have actual investment-backed
expectations? And (2) were those expectations objectively reasonable?261
Some decisions applying Penn Central’s partial regulatory taking test
“note the importance of leaving the claimant with a ‘reasonable return.’
”262 This element is most relevant where the regulation threatens a
property use that existed when the investment was made or the property
acquired.263 The so-called notice rule, however, says that no regulatory
taking can occur when the government restricts use of the parcel under
laws or regulations that existed at the time it was acquired.264 Although it
is now given less-than-dispositive weight, many court decisions “give
substantial, almost dispositive weight to pre-acquisition regulatory

257. Wis. Public Service Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994); FERC Policy
Statement, supra note 33.
258. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
259. Carney, supra note 9, at 335.
260. Katherine Costenbader, Comment, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring
America’s Rivers, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 656 (1998).
261. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
262. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 21.
263. See, e.g., Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323, 1328 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We also have
made clear that . . . the distinct investment-backed expectations factor of the Penn Central test is to
be judged at the time the personal property was acquired.”).
264. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 22.
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schemes,” such as the federal surface mining statute and the federal
wetlands permitting program.265
This notice rule poses an even greater obstacle for plaintiffs in
heavily regulated fields.266 Players in such fields are presumed to lack a
reasonable expectation that the regulatory environment will not change
as the legislature enacts new requirements and reforms.267 Employee
pension plans, coal mining, liquor stores, banking, gaming, the sale of
firearms, and adult entertainment establishments are all considered by
courts to be heavily regulated fields.268 Electric power generation is
certainly also heavily regulated. Project owners’ investment-backed
expectations are not objectively reasonable when operating in the
constantly evolving regulatory field of hydropower. While an order to
decommission a hydropower project “particularly interferes” with the
primary use or owner’s expectation for the parcel,269 the heavily
regulated nature of the field continues to weigh against the objective
reasonableness of any investment-backed expectation necessary for a
regulatory taking.
There is also a more fundamental reason to refuse to recognize an
objectively reasonable investment-backed expectation. As a matter of
policy, the idea that there is an obligation on the part of the government
to renew a license runs contrary to Congress’s motive for limiting license
terms.270 The renewal licensing process is designed to provide an
opportunity to reevaluate whether renewal of the hydropower licenses
serves the current public interest.271

265. Id. at 23 (citing Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(federal surface mining statute); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(federal surface mining statute); and United States v. Donovan, 466 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D. Del. 2006)
(federal wetlands permitting program)).
266. Id. (“Those who voluntarily enter a “heavily regulated field” find regulatory takings
claims particularly difficult to maintain.”).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 645–46 (1993) (employee pension plans); Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349 (coal mining);
People’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F. Supp. 2d 200, 215 (D. Mass. 2006) (liquor
stores); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (banking); Hawkeye
Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007) (gaming); Akins v.
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619, 623 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (the sale of firearms); McCrothers Corp. v. City
of Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124, 141 (N.D. 2007) (adult entertainment establishments).
269. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 24.
270. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2009) (“Licenses . . . shall not be issued for a period exceeding fifty
years.”).
271. The FPA protects the public interest: “[T]he project adopted . . . will be best adapted . . .
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water
power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife . .
. and for other beneficial uses . . . .” Id. § 803(a).
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Since a hydropower project is constructed under a license of limited
duration, and with no guarantee of renewal, the project owner cannot
claim a protected entitlement to make economic use of the facilities it
constructed in order to take advantage of the original FERC license.272
Licenses are a privilege, not a right.273 As the Supreme Court opined,
“[P]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source . . . .”274
Once the license expires, the contract between the licensee and the
government ends and the property right is extinguished.275
4. Property Interests in the Value of the Water Power and the Land
as a Hydropower Site
A project owner may claim a property interest in the potential value
of the water power or land as a hydropower site. The U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently rejected this claim.276 In United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., the government exercised the
federal navigation servitude and revoked Chandler-Dunbar’s hydropower
license.277 Although Chandler-Dunbar owned the riparian land, the Court
noted it “had no such vested property right in the water power inherent in
the falls and rapids of the river.”278 The federal government’s dominant
right to take the navigable river flow for interstate commerce defeated
compensation claims for the loss of water for power production.279 The
272. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding revocation of a fishery’s permits under the 1997 and 1998 Appropriations Acts which
would bar it from receiving future permits did not constitute a regulatory taking of the fishery’s
vessel).
273. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a
claim by an insurance company that a decision of the Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management
Agency not to approve the claimant’s planned sale of a portfolio of crop insurance policies is a
taking because such sales are subject to pervasive federal regulatory review). For more on the
“heavily regulated industry” concept, see MELTZ, supra note 202, at 23.
274. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
275. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 (“[P]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source . . . .”).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 68–69 (1913)
(holding a project owner does not acquire a property interest in the water power value of a site);
United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 236 (1960) (finding Fifth Amendment
compensation provision does not apply to lost water power value or opportunity to produce
hydropower); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 223 (1956) (stating that “the
exclusion of riparian owners from the benefits of the power in a navigable stream without
compensation is entirely within the Government’s discretion.”).
277. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 67.
278. Id. at 76.
279. Id. at 74.
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hydropower project was “placed in the river under a permit which the
company knew was likely to be revoked at any time” on account of the
federal navigation servitude.280 Speaking eloquently, the Court held that
the hydropower owner has no property interest in the water power value
of a site: “[T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable
of private ownership is inconceivable.”281
5. Loss of Water Rights
A hydropower licensee may argue that denial of a hydropower
license deprives it of either some or all of the value of its water rights,
but no vested property right exists in the value of water to generate
electricity,282 and a licensee maintains whatever water use rights it had
prior to decommissioning. In states that follow the prior appropriation
system of water rights, however, a licensee’s water rights may be
completely lost after a hydropower license is denied. Prior appropriation
is the predominant water rights allocation system in the western United
States.283 Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, available water is
allocated on a first-come, first-served basis to anyone who puts the water
to a beneficial off-stream use. 284
Unlike the riparian water use system, mere ownership of land does
not give rights to water use.285 To possess a water right in a prior
appropriation system, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) there must be
an intent to apply the water to a beneficial use, (2) there must be an
actual diversion of water from its natural source, and (3) there must be
continued application of the water to a beneficial use.286 This beneficial
use requirement means that the hydropower licensee would lose its
appropriative water right by ceasing to make a beneficial use of the right
following dam removal.287 Alaska, for example, broadly defines
beneficial uses to include the protection of fish and wildlife habitat,

280. Id. at 68.
281. Id. at 69.
282. See supra notes 167–75 and accompanying text.
283. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Water Appropriation Systems, WESTERN STATES WATER LAWS,
http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/appsystems.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
284. Joseph L. Sax et al., Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases and Materials 125 (4th ed.
2006).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 157. Sax posits that the doctrine of beneficial use may be able to impose a new
requirement on a hydropower dam to maintain specified flows at specified times for fish and
recreation if the original hydropower appropriation is deemed no longer beneficial.
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recreation and parks, navigation, and sanitation and water quality.288
Wyoming, however, only recognizes fisheries as a beneficial use, so
unless the project owner applies its water right to fish propagation, it
would lose its water right.289
Sadly, seemingly beneficial uses like the preservation of the natural
environment are not viewed as “beneficial” by all states. This creates
disincentives—if not roadblocks—to applying water rights toward
conservation efforts. State statutes generally provide for a loss of water
rights through forfeiture, defined as unexcused non-use for a period of
years.290 The extent of the economic loss from the water right will also
depend on how forgiving the state is in authorizing changes in use or
transfers to new diverters. Most prior appropriation states impose strict
conditions on, or disallow, the transfer of nonconsumptive uses to
consumptive ones.291 Hydropower generation is a nonconsumptive use.292
Granted, protection of fish and wildlife habitat are nonconsumptive uses,
but they have little economic worth to the licensee. If the licensee is
unable to transfer the water right, or put it to beneficial use, a total loss
of the value of the water right may occur, necessitating a Lucas taking
inquiry.
The state’s appropriative system may also be subject to the public
trust doctrine, which holds that water is public property belonging to all
the citizens of a state.293 The public trust doctrine precludes anyone from
acquiring a vested right to harm the public trust and imposes a continuing
duty on the state to take public uses into account when allocating water
resources. In California, the public trust doctrine is subsumed in the
state’s water rights system.294 Colorado, however, has rejected the public
trust doctrine.295 The extent to which the public trust doctrine may limit a
hydropower project owner’s compensable property interest in water

288. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Western States Instream Flow Summary, WESTERN STATES
WATER LAWS, http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/stateflowsummary.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2012).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 125.
291. William Goldfarb, Water Law 34–35. (2d ed. 1988).
292. James J. Jacobs & Donald J. Brosz, Wyoming's Water Resources (June 1993)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://library.wrds.uwyo.edu/wrp/93-12/93-12.html.
293. See In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 440–41 (Haw. 2000) (upholding
the use of the public trust doctrine to force appropriators to release impounded water for the benefit
of a stream).
294. Nat'l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine City, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983)
(holding reallocation of water for scenic preservation is not a taking under the Fifth Amendment
because the water rights holder’s property interest was subject to the public trust).
295. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (holding that the framers of the state
constitution intended that the waters of natural streams be dedicated to appropriation and use).
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rights thus depends upon the law of the state in which the project is
located.
Even in states that follow the riparian system of water rights, a
licensee may have a very limited ability to use or market its water use
rights following project decommissioning and dam removal. In a riparian
system, the right to use water is defined in terms of ownership of riparian
land.296 Riparian lands are the portions of a parcel that abut a water body.
Water rights are owned by the property owner riparian to the
waterway.297 Historically, the use of water on distant, nonriparian
parcels, though owned by a riparian landowner within the same
watershed, was viewed as unreasonable.298 This limitation is still in
effect, although modern reasonable use jurisdictions now generally
require proof of actual harm caused by the water’s use on nonriparian
lands.299 The riparian system further restricts water rights by limiting
their use to an owner’s land within the same watershed.300 Most
jurisdictions view water use outside the watershed as per se
unreasonable, but many will not prevent it unless another riparian is
actually harmed.301 These limitations on use, combined with the
appurtenant, place-specific nature of riparian rights, can render a project
owner’s remaining water rights difficult to transfer.
In conclusion, a decommissioning order does not deprive a licensee
of its water use rights; the licensee maintains whatever water use rights it
had prior to decommissioning. The FPA does not affect state laws or
water rights.302 Any limitations on the use or transferability of those
water rights are a result of state law, making the limitations Lucas
background principles of property that prevent the licensee from ever
possessing the rights in the first place.303 This simple precept should bar
taking claims from project owners in all states and water rights systems
for any loss of water rights due to FERC’s license denial and
decommissioning order. Complaints concerning the marketability of
residual water use rights should be directed at state legislatures, not the
federal government.

296. David H. Getches, Water Law in a Nut Shell 24 (4th ed. 2009).
297. SAX, supra note 284, at 27.
298. Id. at 53.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 30.
301. Id. at 31.
302. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2009) (“Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water . . . or any vested right acquired therein.”).
303. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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The preceding analysis shows that FERC faces little liability from
project owners when denying renewal of a hydropower license and
issuing a dam removal order to serve the public interest. An order from
FERC to decommission a hydropower project and remove a dam will not
result in a compensable Fifth Amendment taking. Hydropower project
licensees generally lack the prerequisite vested property interests
required for a taking, and any effects on truly vested property interests
fail to qualify as a compensable taking.
B. The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Taking Claims
1. The Doctrine of Public Ownership of Wildlife
The ESA has frequently been attacked under the Fifth Amendment
taking doctrine. Opponents of the ESA have argued that its true purpose
“is really about [the] unconstitutional, uncompensated taking of private
property.”304 This argument came to a head with the proposed Just
Compensation Act of 1993, which would have required federal agencies
to compensate private property owners for any diminution in value
caused by a regulatory action taken under certain environmental laws,
including the ESA.305 The bill remains unenacted, perhaps because, as
former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt contends, “It is a
pernicious way of saying we are going to destroy the efficacy of
government.”306 Instead, Babbitt counters, use of the ESA is a valid
exercise of sovereign power, similar to planning and zoning laws:
“Regulatory action taken for a valid public purpose can have
consequences that legally inconvenience people and, from time to time,
do diminish someone’s rights.”307 Yet the ESA is not a land-use law; “It
is a law which says we are going to protect public property—wild and
endangered species—but it acknowledges that in many cases the only
efficacious way to protect an endangered species is to protect habitat.”308
By protecting habitat, the ESA inevitably impinges on some property
interests, but are these protected interests that require compensation if
taken?
Long before the ESA existed, federal and state courts answered that
question in the negative. The public ownership doctrine was invoked to
uphold state authority to regulate uses of private property without
304. Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation Within
the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 357 (1994).
305. Just Compensation Act of 1993, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. (1st. Sess. 1993).
306. Babbitt, supra note 304, at 359.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 360.
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requiring compensation for the protection or restoration of wildlife. In
1884, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the concept to fish protection:
The nature of fish impels them periodically to pass up and down
streams for breeding purposes, and in such streams no one, not even
the owner of the soil over which the stream runs, owns the fish
therein, or has any legal right to obstruct their passage up or down,
for to do so would be to appropriate what belongs to all to his own
individual use, which would be contrary to the common right, and
all having a common and equal ownership, nothing short of legislative power can regulate and control the enjoyment of this common
ownership.309

Therefore, the public ownership doctrine can lead to the stateordered destruction of private dams blocking fish migration.310 Courts
have upheld a state’s power to do so. For example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that it was not a taking to order the
destruction of a private dam, noting that an implied limitation on a
landowner’s operation of a dam is that “fish should not be interrupted in
their passage up the river to cast their spawn . . . [and this] limitation
must extend to give a right to the government to enter and remove
obstructions, which, if not removed, would defeat the limitation.”311 The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court reached a similar holding in rejecting a
private dam owner’s challenge to the state’s right to enter his property
and destroy his dam.312 State officials have the right to take such an
action, because “the common law rights of the riparian proprietor . . .
yielded to the paramount claims of the public.”313 These early cases
establish public rights in wild animals, but they do not address the
question of whether public ownership of wildlife bars Fifth Amendment
taking claims that arise from application of the ESA.
The prelude to any Fifth Amendment taking analysis is whether the
claimant possesses a protected property interest. Under Lucas, a taking
claim is barred if the limitation “inheres in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law or property and
309. Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 588–89 (1884); see also Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79
Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 249 (1859) (holding “the right of the public to the passage of fish in rivers, and
the private rights of riparian proprietors, incident to and dependent on the public right, have been
subject to the regulation of the legislature”); State v. Roberts, 59 N.H. 484, 486 (1879) (holding the
state has the right “to regulate the destruction or preservation of fish, their free passage, and the use
of the water as a highway,” even where such streams are nonnavigable and cross private land).
310. John Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 347 (2003).
311. Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 522, 529 (1808).
312. Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 232–34 (1835).
313. Id. at 229.
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nuisance already place upon land ownership.”314 A strong argument can
be made that public ownership of wildlife establishes a “preexisting”
limitation on private title, thus limiting the landowner’s right to maintain
a dam blocking migratory fish.315 Actions mandated by the ESA may
also fall under the umbrella of background principles of nuisance law,316
“nuisance” being defined as “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.”317 Ownership rights in wildlife are
common to all members of the public.318 The death of a wild animal—a
threatened or endangered one, no less—can therefore be characterized as
an “unreasonable interference” with public rights.319 Maintenance of a
dam, or any other activity that invades public rights in wildlife, is a
nuisance under Lucas and not a protected property right.
The public ownership argument has been used successfully to defeat
Fifth Amendment taking claims based on laws protecting endangered
species. In 2000, the New York Supreme Court relied on the argument
and the ESA to reject a taking claim involving a property owner wishing
to mine his property and the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC), the state agency implementing the ESA.320 The
plaintiff had begun the process of applying for a mining permit when the
den of a timber rattlesnake, a threatened species under New York law,
was discovered on an adjacent parcel.321 The den’s close proximity to
plaintiff’s parcel meant that the snakes would use portions of plaintiff’s
property as forage habitat.322 The plaintiff therefore constructed a fence
to keep the snakes off his property.323 In response, the DEC filed suit
seeking an injunction requiring the removal of the fence.324 The owner
opposed, claiming that the injunction was a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.325 The court affirmed the grant of an injunction and rejected
the taking claim, holding that
the State, through the exercise of its police power, is safeguarding
the welfare of an indigenous species that has been found to be
314. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
315. Echeverria et al., supra note 310, at 352–53.
316. Id.
317. Restatement (Second) of Torts §851B (1979).
318. Echeverria, supra note 310, at 352.
319. Id. (citing Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 588 (1884)) ("No one . . . owns the fish . . . or
has the legal right to obstruct their passage up or down, for to do so would be to appropriate what
belongs to all to his own individual use.").
320. See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
321. Id. at 80.
322. Id. at 81.
323. Id. at 80.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 82.
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threatened with extinction. The State’s interest in protecting its wild
animals is a venerable principle that can properly serve as a legitimate basis for the exercise of its police power.326

California courts have similarly recognized the power of the public
ownership doctrine to defeat a taking claim. The California District
Court of Appeals concluded that the doctrine of public ownership
supports rejecting a taking claim based on an endangered species
regulation:327 “[W]ildlife regulation of some sort has been historically a
part of the preexisting law of property.”328 This shows that the public
ownership doctrine operates as a Lucas “background principle” of state
law precluding takings liability.329 These later-ESA cases, and earlier
pre-ESA cases involving dams obstructing fish passage,330 demonstrate
that the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife can support the removal
of private dams while shielding the government from Fifth Amendment
taking claims.
2. The Federal Government and Taking Claims from Water Users
As previously discussed, due to the discretionary rule,331 an
agency’s obligation to perform a Section 7 consultation ultimately comes
down to the existence of, or lack of, agency discretion.332 When an
agency has discretion, it may seek a biological opinion (BiOp), pursuant
to Section 7’s consultation requirement, to avoid Section 9 liability for
taking a listed species. A BiOp ensures that the proposed federal action
will not jeopardize the survival and recovery of a listed species. If the
BiOp concludes that the proposed agency action is likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species, “reasonable and prudent
alternatives” are recommended that will avoid jeopardy if
implemented.333 The BiOp may recommend a reduction in water
deliveries, and some water users may claim a taking of their water rights.
The Ninth Circuit has traditionally rejected those taking claims. For
example, in O’Neill v. United States, water users moved to enforce a
326. Id. at 94.
327. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 344–45 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the claim that “a state or federal statute enacted in the interest of protecting
wildlife is unconstitutional because it curtails the use to which real property may be put”).
328. Id. at 347.
329. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
330. See supra notes 309–28 and accompanying text.
331. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009).
332. When pre-ESA legal obligations require a federal agency to operate in a way that leaves
no room for the consideration of a listed species, the discretionary rule limits the applicability of
Section 7’s consultation requirement. See supra notes 74–89 and accompanying text.
333. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2010).
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judgment requiring the United States to perform its water service
contract.334 The court held that a provision in the contract stating that the
government would not be liable for damages arising from shortages in
water supplied due to “errors in operation, drought, or any other cause[]”
relieved the government from liability for not delivering water on
account of valid legislation, even if that legislation was enacted
subsequent to the contract.335
After O’Neill, the Ninth Circuit was again confronted with a
conflict between federal water contracts and the ESA. In Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Houston,336 which involved pre-ESA water
renewal contracts renegotiated after enactment of the ESA, the water
users argued that the Bureau of Reclamation lacked “discretion to alter
the terms of the renewal contracts, particularly the quantity of water
delivered.”337 The court rejected this argument and refused to apply the
discretionary rule that would have exempted compliance with the
ESA.338 The Bureau of Reclamation had discretion when renegotiating
renewal contracts to alter key terms and “may be able to reduce the
amount of water available for sale if necessary to comply with ESA.”339
Following Houston, the case of Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass’n v. Patterson was another victory for the ESA over a federal
contract for water rights.340 In Klamath, petitioners sought enforcement
of a water delivery contract negotiated in 1956, pre-dating the enactment
of the ESA.341 Rejecting their argument, the court, based on the terms of
the contract, held that the Bureau of Reclamation “retains overall
authority over decision in use of Project waters,”342 which includes “the
authority to direct Dam operations to comply with the ESA.”343 Within
the Ninth Circuit, the federal government is free to modify water delivery
contracts for the benefit of a listed species.
Although the Ninth Circuit has rejected Fifth Amendment taking
claims from water rights users, the Court of Federal Claims has not. In
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, the Court of
Federal Claims set a precedent by recognizing a per se physical taking.
Monetary damages were awarded when, in order to retain some instream
334. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1995).
335. Id. at 686.
336. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
337. Id. at 1125.
338. Id. at 1126 (“Where there is no agency discretion to act, the ESA does not apply.”)
339. Id.
340. Klamath Water Users Prot. Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999).
341. Id. at 1209–10.
342. Id. at 1213.
343. Id.
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flows for fish habitat to comply with the ESA, the Bureau of
Reclamation did not deliver water to irrigators as required by state water
delivery contracts.344 Instead of applying a regulatory takings analysis,
the Tulare court found a per se taking by physical invasion of the
plaintiff’s property rights.345 This unusual holding is limited by the
unique facts of the case. The contracts at issue were with the State of
California, not the federal government. The irrigators therefore did not
have to surmount a common clause in Bureau of Reclamation contracts
that excuses the federal government from liability for failure to deliver a
full water supply.346 The water contract was also atypical in that it
specified the volume of water to be delivered.347
After Tulare, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue in a
case from the Klamath Project and reached the same conclusion on very
different grounds. The court first held that the only available remedy to
the irrigators would be a breach of contract claim, not a taking claim:
“Like it or not, water rights, though undeniably precious, are subject to
the same rules that govern all forms of property—they enjoy no elevated
or more protected status. . . . [T]hose rights, such as they exist, take the
form of contract claims and will be resolved as such.”348 The contract
claims were later rejected because enactment of the ESA was a sovereign
act that can give no rise to contractual liability for the government.349
The CFC thus favored enforcement of the ESA over federal
contracts for water, but only for a limited time. Years later, in Casitas
Municipal Water District v. United States, the same Court of Federal
Claims judge would retreat from this physical takings approach,
concluding that the intervening Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency350 decision required a regulatory
taking analysis for the reduction in water availability resulting from an
ESA requirement that water be left instream.351 On appeal, the Federal
344. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246, 254 (Fed. Cl.
2003).
345. Id.
346. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 321 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
347. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 320–21 (distinguishing
O’Neill).
348. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 540 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
349. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 685, 695 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
350. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–24
(2002) (holding that the question of whether the Takings Clause requires compensation when
government enacts temporary regulation denying property owner all viable economic use of property
is to be decided by applying factors of Penn Central, not by applying any categorical rule).
351. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“[TahoeSierra] compels us to respect the distinction between a government takeover of property (either by
physical invasion or by directing the property’s use to its own needs) and the government restraints
on an owner’s use of that property.”).
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Circuit reversed because it saw the ESA-compelled physical diversion of
water as a physical taking of water rights—as opposed to a regulatory
restriction on the amount available for use.352 In reaching this holding,
the Federal Circuit decided a case that was different from that decided by
the Court of Federal Claims.353 Contrary to the Court of Federal Claims’
view of the case, which focused on the water that was required to be left
in the river, the Federal Circuit insisted that the crucial fact in its analysis
was that the regulation did not merely require that water be left in the
river, but instead required the plaintiff to direct water, once it was
diverted out of the river and into the diversion canal, through the fish
passage facility.354 In 2009, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its decision
that a physical taking had occurred.355
There is “no support” whatsoever in precedent for the Casitas
decision for evaluating regulations that require water to be left in a water
body as potential per se takings.356 When the Supreme Court last
addressed the issue over a century ago, it rejected the theory that a state
legislative restriction on the export of water to neighboring states
affected a taking of a riparian water right.357 A per se taking analysis is
therefore incorrect, and a traditional Penn Central analysis should apply
to regulations such as the ESA that limit water use.
Going forward, the Casitas decision should be read narrowly. It
established a precedent applicable only in the particular situation where a
water right holder is subject to an affirmative mandate to direct water
through a fish ladder or some other type of off-river structure.358 The
United States has several strong arguments against future taking claims
that rely on Casitas. For example, even if a per se taking analysis
continues to be applied to an ESA-mandated requirement to divert water
through a fish ladder, the larger regulatory scheme in which the
requirement is imposed indicates that the taking claim should be

352. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
353. See John Echeverria, Four Propositions About the Casitas Litigation (Nov. 6–7, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/2009TakingsConfer
ence/EcheverriaConferencePaper.pdf.
354. Id.
355. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 556 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
356. Echeverria, supra note 353.
357. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
358. Echeverria, supra note 353, at 6.
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evaluated as an exaction under Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n359
and Dolan v. City of Tigard.360
The third form of a Fifth Amendment taking, an exaction—a
regulatory/physical taking hybrid361—arises where a government agency
grants a property owner permission to exploit a property interest, subject
to a condition that would normally be independently viewed as a per se
taking.362 The ESA-mandated diversion in Casitas should have been
viewed as an exaction because the requirement was imposed as a
condition attached to a BiOp which grants regulatory permission for
operation of the dam.363 The taking test for an exaction has two prongs,
known as “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality.”364 Failure to
satisfy either prong of the test is a taking. The essential nexus prong
requires that “an exaction condition . . . must substantially advance a
government purpose that would justify denial of the permit.”365 The
second prong, rough proportionality, requires “the burden imposed on
the property owner by the exaction must be no greater than ‘roughly
proportional’ to the impact of the proposed development on the
community.”366 Application of the essential nexus and rough
proportionality prongs of the exaction test should yield a conclusion that
the regulation did not result in a taking.367 The requirement to divert
water through the fish way for the protection of the fishery is logically
related to—shares an essential nexus with—the government’s regulatory
purpose of reviewing dam operations. The modest amount of water
diverted is more than roughly proportional to the harms caused by the
dam operations that the government is attempting to redress.
In conclusion, there are defenses to counter any Fifth Amendment
taking claim where the ESA alters dam operations or reduces a water
delivery. The public trust doctrine, in those states in which it is subsumed
in the water rights system, provides an additional argument against future
359. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring an “essential nexus”
between the nature of the exaction condition and a legitimate state interest that would justify denial
of the permit).
360. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring the extent of the burden
imposed on the landowner by an exaction condition be “roughly proportional” to the burden that
would be imposed on the community).
361. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 38.
362. Id. Some public purposes include a road, school, or wildlife preservation.
363. Echeverria, supra note 353 at 2, 11.
364. Id.
365. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
366. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND
CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS “TAKINGS” 9 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL31796.pdf; see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 391 (1994).
367. Echeverria, supra note 353, at 11.
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taking claims that rely on Casitas. Where the claimant cannot point to a
protected property interest that has been “taken” by the challenged
regulation, the taking claim cannot succeed. The public trust doctrine
prohibits a water right holder from claiming a property entitlement to
exploit water in a way that is harmful to public trust resources—in this
case wild and endangered species.368 Finally, the doctrine of public
ownership of wildlife and Lucas background principles of state nuisance
law enable the removal of private dams while shielding the government
from Fifth Amendment taking claims.
V. TAKING CLAIMS FROM RIPARIAN PROPERTY OWNERS
Owners of property riparian to waters affected by dam removal may
demand compensation.369 Upstream of the dam, the reservoir can
diminish substantially or disappear following dam removal, exposing
previously submerged lands. When this happens, depending upon who
owns title to the newly surfaced lands, riparian landowners may find
themselves severed from contact with the water and assert a loss of
associated riparian rights. In Wisconsin, for example, a dam owner’s
decision to remove a dam resulted in the filing of a civil suit by the dam
owner’s neighbors.370 The suit alleged that removal of the dam reduced
residential real estate values and altered the quality of their lives and the
enjoyment of their property.371 Downstream, the effects of removing the
dam are reversed. Rivers may swell after a dam is removed, causing
property damage above the high-water mark. Although the previously
discussed federal navigation servitude generally exempts the government
from paying compensation in situations where navigable waters are
involved, a more precise analysis of the servitude’s powers and
jurisdiction is necessary to determine the extent of any potential Fifth
Amendment taking liability.
A. Riparian Rights and Artificial Watercourses
Determining the legal effects upstream of dam removal involves
two separate but related issues: (1) whether the ordinary rules of riparian
rights apply to artificially created water bodies, and (2) who holds title to
the previously submerged lands.

368. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (holding the
public trust doctrine “prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a
manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.”).
369. Smith, supra note 150.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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Riparian rights attach to riparian land, those tracts of land that are
contiguous with the water’s edge.372 A riparian landowner does not own
any portion of the waterbody, but instead owns numerous rights in it
known as usufructuary rights.373 These rights include the following: the
right to the flow of the stream, the right to make a reasonable use of the
waterbody, the right of access to the waterbody, the right to fish, the right
to wharf out, the right to prevent erosion of the banks, the right to purity
of the water, and the right to claim title to the beds of nonnavigable lakes
and streams.374
The Restatement of Torts defines “artificial watercourses” as
“waterways that owe their origin to acts of man, such as canals, drainage
and irrigation ditches, aqueducts, flumes, and the like.”375 Black’s Law
Dictionary similarly defines “artificial watercourse” as “a man-made
watercourse.”376 One example of an artificial waterbody is a lake formed
by a dam and reservoir system that enlarges the water surface of a
preexisting river or stream. These can range in size from small, New
England millponds to the enormous Hoover Dam and Lake Mead.
Conventional wisdom holds that the normal rules of riparian rights
do not attach to artificial watercourses because the expectations of those
owners abutting artificial watercourses are not the same as those of
riparians along a natural watercourse.377 The “artificial” riparian has no
common law right to the maintenance of the artificial watercourse and
cannot compel the maintenance of the water at any particular level.378
372. Panetta v. Equity One, Inc., 920 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 2007) (“Riparian lands are lands
lying along the banks of a stream or water body.”).
373. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 n.7 (Cal. 2000) (“[R]iparian
rights . . . are usufructuary only, and while conferring the legal right to use the water that is superior
to all other users, confer no right of private ownership in public waters.”).
374. GETCHES, supra note 296, at 23.
375. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 841(5)(h) (1979).
376. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1729 (9th ed. 2009).
377. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:25 (2009); see, e.g.,
Tusher v. Gabrielsen, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 126, 135 (1998) (“Ordinarily, riparian rights attach only to a
natural watercourse, and not to an artificial channel . . . .”); Anderson v. Bell, 433 So. 2d 1202, 1209
(Fla. 1983) (“[T]he owner of property that lies adjacent to or beneath a man-made, nonnavigable
water body is not entitled to the beneficial use of the surface waters of the entire water body by sole
virtue of the fact that he/she owns contiguous lands.”); Tyler v. Lincoln, 513 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining doctrine of riparian rights “is simply inapplicable” in situations where
surface water is conveyed to a property “by means of a man-made structure, i.e., a culvert”), rev’d
on other grounds, 272 Ga. 118 (2000); Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 481 (Mich. 1967)
(finding riparian rights of access to a lake do not attach to land connected by an artificial canal);
Crenshaw v. Graybeal, 597 So. 2d 650, 652 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486,
502 (Miss. 1990)) (stating titleholders of artificial lakes exclusively own the waters “whether the
lake or pond has been built for commercial, drainage, recreation or aesthetic reasons”).
378. See Wood v. S. River Drainage Dist., 422 S.W.2d 33, 38–39 (Mo. 1967) (denying relief to
a resort owner who was located on a bay of the Mississippi River that was dammed as part of a
drainage project when the bay was subsequently lowered for drainage reasons).
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More specifically, riparian rights only attach to the “normal flow” of
waters, as opposed to “floodwaters,” into which category a dam’s large
reservoir could be placed.379 At least one court has adopted this view in
holding that waters impounded by dams are floodwaters that confer no
riparian rights.380
What if an artificial watercourse becomes “natural”? Given enough
time, an artificial watercourse such as a reservoir may “take on the
characteristics of a natural watercourse and come to be regarded . . . as
such.”381 In order to determine whether an artificial watercourse has
become “natural,” courts look to three criteria: “(1) whether the
[watercourse] is temporary or permanent,[382] (2) the circumstances
under which it was created,[383] and (3) the mode in which it has been
used or enjoyed.”384 The main question underlying the three criteria is
“whether surrounding landowners have come to treat the [watercourse]
as a natural part of the landscape and adjusted their behavior and
expectations accordingly.”385 “The longer an artificial watercourse is
maintained at a constant level, the stronger the expectations are of
shoreland owners that riparian rights will be recognized.”386
Prescription can be a basis for attaching riparian rights to artificial
waters.387 “Prescriptive rights [are] frequently . . . claimed [in lakes]
maintained at [artificially] high levels for [a] long period[] of time.
[Some riparian] owners whose lands have been subject to prescriptive
easements have asserted a reciprocal negative easement to prevent the
lake from being lowered.”388
Courts have found ways to protect the expectations of these riparian
owners. Removal of a milldam was enjoined because the construction of
cabins along the shore of the artificial lake and their maintenance for the
prescriptive period gave the owners a reciprocal right to compel

379. Cummins v. Travis Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.3d 34, 45
(Tex. App. 2005).
380. Roberson v. Red Bluff Water Power Control Dist., 142 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.
1940).
381. TARLOCK, supra note 377, at § 3:26.
382. Id. (citing Lake Drummond Canal & Water co. v. Burnham, 60 S.E. 605 (N.C. 1908)).
383. Id. (citing Nu-Dwarf Farms, Inc. v. Stratbucker Farmers, Ltd., 470 N.W. 2d 772 (Neb.
1991)).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474, 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding a
50-year old pond created by dam had become a natural water body), rev'd, 273 Conn. 217 (2005).
388. TARLOCK, supra note 377, at § 3:27.
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maintenance of the dam.389 The dam, a “permanent obstruction” having
been maintained for a great length of time, transformed the “artificial
conditions created thereby . . . [to] natural conditions.” 390 The court
observed, “even nature herself became adapted to the new
surrounding.”391 A native growth of hardwood timber had sprung up,
“giving a natural effect and appearance to the conditions created by the
dam.”392
Prescriptive rights could also apply to those who depend on dams to
keep their property dry. A landowner who mined and processed brines
from a lakebed exposed by water diversions recovered damages when the
lake flooded and inundated his plant because substantial expenditures
had been made in reliance on the continued diversions.393 Prescriptive
rights have been asserted on the theory that a dam owner effectively
dedicates the artificial level to the public, although courts generally reject
the argument.394
Where a court refuses to recognize prescriptive rights in artificial
lake levels, the following reasoning of the Nebraska Supreme Court is
typical:
Construction and maintenance of a dam over a long period of time
may well tend to lead persons owning property above the dam to
believe that a permanent and valuable right has been acquired, or is
naturally present. The very fact that a man-made dam is obviously
present, however, is sufficient to charge them with notice that the
water level is artificial as distinguished from natural, and that its
level may be lowered or returned to the natural state at any time. . . .
We hold that where a dam has been built for the private convenience and advantage of the owner, he is not required to maintain and
operate it for the benefit of an upper riparian owner who obtains advantages from its existence; and that the construction and maintenance of such a dam does not create any reciprocal rights in upstream proprietors based on prescription, dedication, and estoppel.395

389. Brown v. Tomlinson, 272 S.E.2d 258, 259–60 (Ga. 1980) (holding appellant has a
prescriptive easement prohibiting appellee from draining an artificially created water body from
appellant’s land by breaching a dam located on appellee’s property).
390. Kray v. Muggli, 86 N.W. 882, 885 (Minn. 1901).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Natural Soda Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 143 P.2d 12, 16 (Cal. 1943).
394. Whitcher v. State, 181 A. 549, 554 (N.H. 1935).
395. Kiwanis Club Found., Inc. v. Yost, 139 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Neb. 1966); accord Green v.
City of Williamstown, 848 F. Supp. 102, 106–07 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (finding Kiwanis rationale
“persuasive”).
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Landowners thus face the challenge of proving riparian rights attach
to their property—either because the watercourse is natural or should be
considered natural. Even if riparian rights are recognized, the Supreme
Court held in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment that
riparian rights do not include an independent right of contact with the
water under Florida law.396 Instead, the right to contact with the water is
a component of the riparian right of access to the water, and exists only
to preserve the core riparian right of access.397 Therefore, so long as
access to the water is maintained, possibly through a public easement, a
landowner’s loss of contact with the water following dam removal may
not be a compensable claim.
B. Before Dam Removal: Title to Submerged Lands
If an artificial riparian right is recognized as a compensable
property right for purposes of a Fifth Amendment taking, the next
question to ask is whether the right is lost. More specifically, is the
riparian right lost because title to the newly exposed lands rests with
someone other than the previously riparian landowner? Under the
doctrine of navigability for title, each state owns the lands beneath its
rivers and lakes that are navigable at the time of statehood.398 Whether a
river is navigable is a federal question to be determined by the
navigability-in-fact test as stated in The Daniel Ball.399 A river is
navigable in fact when, in its ordinary state, it is used as, or capable of
use as, a “highway[] for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted.”400 A state holds title to land under navigable-in-fact
waters in trust to secure public use so that the people “may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private
parties.”401
To facilitate the building of dams, federal statutes empower a
licensee to condemn or otherwise pay for the land to be flooded.402 After
the impoundment submerges new lands, title to the original riverbed of a
navigable river remains with the state after the water’s artificial
396. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114 (Fla. 2008),
aff'd sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.Ct. 2592
(2010).
397. Id. at 1119.
398. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (“If indeed the lake were navigable at [the
time of statehood], the claim of Utah would override any claim of the United States.”).
399. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871).
400. Id.
401. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
402. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 814 (2009).
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expansion.403 Defining the extent of the state’s ownership, however,
requires identifying submerged boundaries—no easy task. In order to
answer the question of who holds title to these lands when they
resurface, it must be determined who holds title to them after they are
submerged. Title to the lands artificially flooded under the Federal Power
Act and other federal legislation could be owned by the state, the
condemner, or the abutting riparian owners.
The issue is further complicated by the additional question of which
law to apply: federal or state. Federal courts ordinarily defer to state law
to define property rights below the high-water mark.404 “In the case of
artificial reservoirs, however, it is unclear whether federal courts will
apply [state or federal law].”405 An exception to the rule of federal
deference to state water law occurs in conflicts involving the federal
navigation servitude.406 Another occurs “where [riparian] title rests with
or was derived from the Federal Government,” in which case federal law
governs.407 Hydropower project licensees, preferring the application of
federal law, sometimes rely upon this last exception, but artificial
reservoirs are not typically created on federal land.408 Instead, a federal
licensee’s title is generally derived from condemnation privileges; title to
the land comes from state or private owners.409 Hence, the creation of an
artificial reservoir on state or private land will “not present a situation
where the United States Government has never parted with title and its
interest in the property continues.”410 Even where federal land is flooded,
the argument can be made that use of the Federal Power Act or the
Reclamation Act “to displace state riparian ownership laws would
deprive the states of a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty—title
and control over submerged lands.”411 In practice, federal courts will
probably subject state claims to both federal and state law.412

403. Roy H. Andes, Divvying Atlantis: Who Owns the Land Beneath Navigable Manmade
Reservoirs?, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (1996) (arguing that ownership rests with the
state both on legal and public policy grounds).
404. E.g., Oregon ex. rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363, 370 (1977)
(“The equal-footing doctrine did not, therefore, provide a basis for federal law to supersede the
State's application of its own law in deciding title to the Bonelli land, and state law should have been
applied unless there were present some other principle of federal law requiring state law to be
displaced.”).
405. Andes, supra note 403, at 91.
406. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. at 375–76.
407. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 (1982).
408. Andes, supra note 403, at 92.
409. Id.
410. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 93.
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Both recent and historic state cases show that title to private lands
flooded by the construction of a federal dam transfers to the state. The
California Supreme Court has held that the state’s waterline statutes
constitute an affirmative “conveyance,” granting all land above the lowwater mark to adjoining landowners.413 By necessity, this conveys to the
state “a ‘claim’ to all flooded lands below the low-water mark.”414
Finding otherwise would inhibit the state’s public trust responsibilities.415
Perhaps most significantly, these rights were defined using the current
water levels artificially raised by dams.416
In another case, the California Supreme Court based its decision on
the physical difficulty of reconstructing the original water levels, noting
the “monumental evidentiary problem” that would be created.417
Principles of prescription and adverse possession also supported a
transfer of title to the state.418 Furthermore, the artificial conditions
created by the dam had become natural, placing “title to the lands
covered by the waters of the lake [in] the same trust as that of lands
covered by the waters of natural navigable lakes.”419
The theory that a dam builder dedicates his submerged waters to the
state was adopted as early as 1899 in Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy:
When the owner of the land raised the lake level so as to cover it,
such land immediately became subject to use by the public as a part
of the natural lake bed, not by permission of the owner of the paper
title, but by the same right that the public used any other part of the
lake . . . . [This] brings into play the principle of estopped in paid,
which precludes him from revoking what is legally considered a
dedication of his land affected by his acts, to the public use.420

Thus, when a navigable river is artificially expanded, title to the
submerged lands—state or private—passes to the state. But the question
still remains: Does title to these submerged lands remain with the state
after they reemerge?

413. State v. Sup. Ct. of Lake Cnty. (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239, 242 (Cal. 1981).
414. Andes, supra note 403, at 96.
415. Id.
416. Lyon, 625 P.2d at 252 n.20 (“We conclude . . . the determination of the boundary . . . must
be assessed in accordance with the shoreline of the lake as it exists presently.”).
417. State v. Sup. Ct. of Placer Cnty. (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 261 (Cal. 1981).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, 79 N.W. 436, 438 (Wis. 1899).
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C. After Dam Removal: Title to Reemerged Lands
The Supreme Court of Maine held title to the exposed lands does
not transfer to the previously riparian owner: “When the waters of these
Ponds were drained, it exposed the bed of the Ponds below low-water
mark, but that did not transfer title to the exposed bed to the littoral
proprietor.”421 In Florida, the common law doctrine of reliction, defined
as “an increase of the land by a gradual and imperceptible withdrawal of
any body of water,” vests title to the new land with the riparian owner.422
The doctrine was held inapplicable, however, in a state lake-lowering
project that exposed shore land because, among other reasons, the water
did not recede “by imperceptible degrees.”423 Florida courts also
recognize the common law rule of avulsion. Avulsion is “the sudden or
perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a
sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream.”424 If an
avulsive event has occurred, “the boundary between public and private
land remains the [mean high water line] as it existed before the avulsive
event led to sudden and perceptible . . . additions to the shoreline.”425
Thus, title to newly exposed lands following dam removal does not
transfer away from the state to the previously riparian owner.
D. A Taking Analysis of “Artificial” Riparian Rights
If the state’s continued interest in the reemerged land survives dam
removal, some previously riparian owners may claim a loss of riparian
rights where their property no longer touches the water. Stop the Beach
Renourishment cautioned that Florida law does not recognize an
independent riparian right of contact with the water, and loss of that
contact with the water is not a compensable taking so long as the riparian
right of access to the water is preserved.426 Assuming, arguendo, that the
affected riparian is in a state that recognizes an independent riparian right
of contact with the water as a protected property interest, which taking
analysis applies? If the parcel as a whole rule427 is applied, the
elimination of one stick from the bundle of property rights, in this case
the “stick” that represents riparian rights, is not a taking when the parcel

421. Ray v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 120 A. 47, 49 (Me. 1923).
422. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d
934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
423. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927).
424. Sand Key, 512 So.2d at 936 (emphasis added).
425. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114 (Fla. 2008),
cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2792 (2009).
426. Id. at 1118.
427. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
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is considered as a whole.428 While the “fronting of a lot upon a navigable
stream or bay often constitutes its chief value and desirability,”429 the
property retains the ability to be developed in an economically viable
way after it loses contact with the water.430 Moreover, the issue is moot if
courts refuse to recognize an “artificial” riparian interest in the first
place.
E. Flooding and Property Damage Occurring Above the High Water
Mark
The flooding of downstream lands following dam removal presents
another potential source of liability. The federal navigation servitude’s
protection from Fifth Amendment taking claims is limited to lands below
the high water mark.431 When a dam is constructed to improve
navigability, the government must pay for the land it floods. In the
seminal case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff was owed compensation for the 640 acres of his land that
were flooded: “Where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any
artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its
usefulness, it is a taking within the meaning of the Constitution.”432 Thus
when the government, through its creation of artificial structures, floods
land where no such condition previously existed, a physical taking will
be recognized by courts.
Where, however, intermittent flooding naturally occurred prior to
the installation of an artificial structure, courts are less likely to find a
physical taking.433 For example, in Leeth v. United States, the Court of
Federal Claims rejected a taking claim where the property had been

428. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)) (explaining
the parcel as a whole rule for Penn Central’s regulatory taking analysis).
429. Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 507 (Fla. 1918).
430. See John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1535, 1557–62 (1994) (explaining that the takings inquiry should be whether the acreage
whose inclusion is in question, presumably the nonriparian portions, could be independently
developed in an economically viable way).
431. United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 804–05 (1950) (holding the United
States liable for the destruction of the agricultural value of the land above the ordinary high water
mark of the river).
432. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871); see also United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (“[W]here the government by the construction of a dam or other public
works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a
taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.”).
433. Sharon S. Tisher, Everglades Restoration: a Constitutional Takings Analysis, 10 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1994).
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particularly susceptible to flooding prior to construction of the dam. 434
The court adopted this reasoning again in Laughlin v. United States
holding no taking occurred when a marsh was created by a flood control
project because the land was subject to the risk of periodic overflows by
floodwater.435 Can this be applied to situations where land floods
downstream after the government removes a dam for purposes of
navigation?
Courts should treat the downstream flooding that results from dam
removal as a noncompensable injury rather than a per se physical taking.
Dams provide flood control. Any riparian land that floods after a dam is
removed was inherently vulnerable to flooding before the dam was
constructed. Leeth and Laughlin counsel against the validity of any such
taking claim.
Recently, landowners along the original—now dewatered—riverbed
of the San Joaquin River filed a taking claim against the United States in
response to the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement’s plan to
restore water flows for endangered salmon.436 The plaintiffs allege that
the restoration will result in a taking of both their land and water
rights.437 Approximately sixty to one hundred miles of the old riverbed of
the San Joaquin River have lain continuously dry, except during rare
flood events, since the Friant Dam and its related irrigation channels
were completed nearly sixty years ago.438 In order to reintroduce salmon
to the river, channel improvements will be made to the old riverbed and
water will be procured from current users for release from the Friant
Dam so that a continuous flow of water can be achieved down the river’s
length at a level sufficient to support salmon.439 The riverbed currently
has a zero-flow capacity; it has been flattened and farmed by plaintiffs.440
The Bureau of Reclamation may therefore excavate portions of
plaintiff’s soil to a depth of between four to nine feet, and remove a
width of 300 to 1,000 feet, for a length of twenty to thirty miles.441 Head
gate and slough control structures may be erected on and with access
through the plaintiff’s property.442 An additional claim—similar to that in
434. Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467 (1991).
435. See Laughlin v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 85, 102 (1990) (refusing to hold the Bureau of
Reclamation liable for flooding as a result of “whatever climactic conditions nature chooses to
deliver.”).
436. Complaint, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co., v. United States, No. 10-580 L (Fed. Cl. Aug. 26,
2010).
437. Id. at 15.
438. Id. at 9.
439. Id. at 13.
440. Id. at 17.
441. Id. at 18.
442. Id.
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Kansas City443—asserts that restoration of the river will result in seepage
and raising of underground water and salt levels so as to destroy the
land’s agricultural and cattle grazing potential.444 The plaintiff speculates
that “non-farmable ‘forested/wooded plains’ ” will be created for up to
one mile on either side of the river, thereby destroying “thousands of
acres” of farmland.445 The final complaint concerns a public easement,
required by California law, which must be placed on the land to provide
ingress and egress for public fishing and recreation activities on the
river.446 This case could have answered many of the important questions
raised by this article, but on December 9, 2010, the parties to the case
have agreed to pursue resolution of the case through alternative dispute
resolution.447
VI. SEDIMENT: AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF LIABILITY FOLLOWING
DAM REMOVAL
One final source of liability exists for dam owners following dam
removal. All dams “create reservoirs behind the impoundment that will
eventually fill with sediment.”448 There is currently no best management
practice for sediment.449 Some dam owners manage the accumulated
sediment by dredging and removing it before dam removal. If dredging is
not performed, the impoundment is either drained through the gates of
the dam or, with a nongated dam, notching is performed to breach
segments of the dam.450
Erosion, flooding, and the release of potentially toxic sediment may
occur as a result. “[S]ediment may contain contaminants ranging from
agricultural pesticides to industrial waste and heavy metals.”451 The river
443. United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). In Kansas City, the plaintiff
demanded compensation for the agricultural value of a portion of his land that was now unsuitable
for farming after construction of a dam raised the water table so that the land would not drain
adequately. Id. at 801–04.
444. See Complaint, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co., supra note 436, at 19.
445. Id. at 20.
446. Id. at 22–23.
447. As of May 24, 2011, the parties are in the dispute resolution process. See Denial of
Motion to Intervene, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, No. 10-580 L (Fed. Cl. May 24,
2011), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/HEWITT.WOLFSEN052411.p
df.
448. Catherine C. Engberg, The Dam Owner’s Guide to Retirement Planning: Assessing
Owner Liability for Downstream Sediment Flow from Obsolete Dams, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 179,
179 (2002) (citing MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 472 (Penguin Books 1993) (1986)).
449. Stephanie Lindloff, DAM REMOVAL A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RESTORING RIVERS 91 (2000),
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itself will physically change as the sediment deposits in downstream
channels, making them shallower and wider.452 “As a result,
[downstream] riparian land becomes more susceptible to increased
erosion and property damage,” including flooding.453 These effects are
greatest when a dam is removed without first dredging the impounded
sediment.
The tort law of trespass may hold dam owners liable for the release
of this sediment. A trespass action is conceptually appropriate because it
requires showing only that the dam’s accumulated sediment was a
physical entry onto land.454 Unfortunately, this has the effect of creating
a disincentive for the voluntary removal of dams for fear of liability to
downstream landowners. Traditional tort and property law principles
afford a dam owner relatively few defenses.455 To remedy this and create
incentives for the removal of obsolete dams, courts can recognize the
defenses of modern comparative negligence and public policy for the
benefit of public safety and environmental restoration.456
Additionally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),457 empowers the EPA to
order responsible parties to remove toxins from sediment before dam
removal. In 1973, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation petitioned FERC
to remove the Fort Edward Dam on the Hudson River because repair of
the dam structure would be economically infeasible.458 The Commission
granted the petition but required Niagara Mohawk to remove the
sediment behind the impoundment.459 Despite the efforts of the
Commission to minimize the adverse effects, nearly 200 miles of the
Hudson River were contaminated and the area was declared a Superfund
site.460 General Electric had discharged approximately 1.1 million pounds
of PCBs into the Hudson River from two upstream plants.461 As this
example illustrates, liability for toxic sediments ultimately rests with
their creator, which may or may not be the dam owner. This eliminates
one major potential source of liability for voluntary dam removal where
the dam owner played no role in the creation of the toxic sediment
behind the impoundment.
452. Id. at 185.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 222.
456. Id.
457. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2010).
458. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 49 F.P.C. 1352, 1353 (1973).
459. Id. at 1357.
460. Pyle, supra note 109, at 110–11.
461. Id. at 110.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As the preceding analysis shows, viable legal tools exist for
removing obsolete dams whose existence no longer benefits the public.
The ESA may be less effective than its drafters intended, but it remains a
compelling reason for voluntary dam removal and has been successful in
changing the way dams operate for the benefit of threatened species.
Meanwhile, federal and state dam safety proceedings are also spurring
voluntary dam removals, and likely offer the easiest route toward dam
removal. Removal of unsafe dams benefits both people and the
environment, and, as the majority of America’s dams are nearing the end
of their structural lifespan, removal is often more practical than repair.
Finally, the government itself has now recognized the value of a freeflowing river over electric power generation and private profit. The
FERC’s Edwards Dam decommission order marked a historic shift in the
way the federal government looks at dams.
These legal options can be exercised without fear of Fifth
Amendment taking liability. When FERC denies renewal of a
hydropower license, licensees are not entitled to compensation. A license
is a privilege, not a right, and a project owner enjoys no guarantee of
license renewal as a property interest. For ESA-mandated dam removal,
the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife and Lucas background
principles of state nuisance law defeat most taking claims. Reducing
water rights for the benefit of a listed species remains a tumultuous topic,
but current Fifth Amendment taking law favors no taking. Compensation
claims by parties other than dam owners affected by dam removal should
similarly fail. Upstream of removal, courts should treat the water body as
an artificial one to which no riparian rights attach. If a court instead treats
the reservoir as a natural water body to which riparian rights would
normally attach, the core riparian right of access to the water can be
easily preserved through the use of an easement. Downstream of
removal, taking claims from flooding should not be recognized as the
landowner’s parcel was susceptible to flooding before the construction of
the dam, and would be flooded in the water’s natural, unobstructed state.
Finally, while sediment liability is a concern for many dam owners,
CERCLA will rest liability for toxic sediment with its creator, and courts
should consider comparative negligence and the benefit inured to the
public by dam removal when hearing tort actions for trespass.
Dam removal is a site-specific process and is not always appropriate
for legal, political, and even ecological reasons. However, where the
public interest favors it, dam removal can be accomplished using
strategies that defeat or minimize taking claims and other bases for
liability. Dangerous and dated dams must not obstruct the restoration of
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America’s treasured waters and doom our nation’s most celebrated
fishes.

